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INTRODUCTION
A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether a suit may be maintained as a class action. Variations on this phrase populate the class action
jurisprudence of the federal courts. The sentiment reflects the equity roots
of the representative class proceeding—a history that has been thoroughly

† Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. As ever, my work has benefited
from the generous input of brilliant colleagues. I owe much to Steve Burbank, Sam Issacharoff,
Anthony Scirica, and David Shapiro. Equally important are the contributions of Sydney Scott,
Penn Law Class of 2013, who undertook a daunting project with persistence and extraordinary skill
and produced the initial research file upon which the body of this Article was constructed.
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investigated by leading scholars in the field of civil procedure,1 structured
the work of the committee that drafted modern Rule 23,2 and has repeatedly
been embraced by the Supreme Court as a necessary starting point when
interpreting and applying the Rule in modern practice.3 The power of the
federal courts to exercise discretion when deciding whether to permit a suit
to proceed as a class action has long been treated as an elemental component
of a representative proceeding. It is therefore cause for surprise that there is
no broad consensus regarding the nature and definition of this judicial
discretion in the certification process. The federal courts have not coalesced
around a clear or thorough exposition of the question, and the scholarly
literature has not provided a sustained analytical treatment.
Since the adoption of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, lower federal
courts have regularly exercised discretion in a range of modes when presented
with requests for class certification. The management of class proceedings is
perhaps the most widely acknowledged form of this discretion. The authority
of district courts to make judgments about how to structure a complex
proceeding—and to decide whether practical obstacles to the fair and
accurate adjudication of claims on a class-wide basis make certification
inappropriate—is a familiar one that enjoys an explicit textual foundation in
Rule 23(b)(3) proceedings. 4 Similarly, district courts sometimes exercise
discretion in defining the parameters of the class definition and deciding
when subclasses are necessary, often acting independently of any proposals
made by the parties. 5 And district courts—frequently acting with the
imprimatur of the courts of appeals—have invoked a broad range of considerations to decide when class certification is desirable, appropriate, or
1 See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing the roots of the class action device); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849,
1858-61 (1998) (examining the device’s English antecedents).
2 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-80 (1967) (discussing the equity roots of the
class action provision revised and expanded in the 1966 amendments).
3 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832-41 (1999) (surveying the use of class actions
in state equity courts predating the Rules Enabling Act); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“Rule 23, governing federal-court class actions, stems from equity practice
and gained its current shape in an innovative 1966 revision.”).
4 See FED. R. CIV . P. 23(b)(3)(D) (requiring that a district court consider “the likely difficulties in managing a class action” in deciding whether to authorize certification of (b)(3) class
actions).
5 The authority to make judgments on such matters is also made clear in the Rule, though the
textual basis for considering them sua sponte is more debatable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B)
(requiring definition of the class for certification); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (permitting the
creation of subclasses).
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consistent with the underlying substantive law that governs the disputes
brought before them. In (b)(3) proceedings, these determinations are often
explained as an application of the superiority requirement, and in (b)(2)
actions they are sometimes described in terms of the prerequisites for
injunctive relief. However, lower courts have also found these forms of
discretion to be inherent in Rule 23, requiring judges to consider the impact
of substantive law on the certification question without regard to any
specific textual mandate.6
Three propositions have infused this practice of discretionary class certification. The first is an understanding among judges that the modern class
action entails an element of public trust. When a plaintiff comes into court
asking to prosecute the claims of numerous people she has never met, she is
not asserting a purely personal prerogative. Rather, the plaintiff is requesting
that the court employ its authority to initiate a type of proceeding that must
be justified with reference to broader public values: the procedural and
systemic values embodied in Rule 23 itself, and the policies of the underlying
law governing the dispute. Second, class actions entail substantial uncertainty.
The question whether claims can be faithfully adjudicated and successfully
managed on a classwide basis is often difficult to predict at the inception of
a proceeding. And third, this combination of broad public interests and
factual indeterminacy sometimes calls for experimentation as courts test the
capacity of the class action to facilitate the “just, speedy, and inexpensive”
resolution of mass claims.7
Because of these realities, discretion in class certification—in particular,
the discretion not to certify a class even though the threshold requirements
of the Rule appear to be satisfied—serves a vital systemic role. Discretion is
a safety valve. It enables district judges to avoid issuing certification orders
that would undermine substantive policies or set in motion unnecessary and
counterproductive remedies. In the absence of this tool, lower federal courts
are left only with a blunt instrument to avoid adverse results in difficult
cases: categorical limitations on the threshold conditions of certification,
which threaten to constrain class litigation in all types of disputes. At the
same time, the discretionary power to decline certification raises legitimate
questions about fairness, consistency of application, and the danger that
courts will make inappropriate legislative judgments. The courts of appeals
have addressed these concerns in a range of cases over the last five decades,
and more attention to the limits of these discretionary powers is needed.
6 See, e.g., Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 643 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting a
district court’s “inherent power to manage and control its own pending litigation”).
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.8 makes the need for a systematic examination of these matters more salient. In one of the few passages that garnered
a majority of an otherwise fractured opinion, the Court used language that
could be read to deprive district courts of any discretion when deciding
whether certification is appropriate in a given case9—a holding that would
upend forty-five years of practice under modern Rule 23. Using language to
describe Rule 23(b) that I have found in no other reported decision, the
majority explained that “[t]he discretion suggested by Rule 23’s ‘may’ is
discretion residing in the plaintiff [and not the district court]: He may bring
his claim in a class action if he wishes.”10 The Court did not indicate that it
was effecting any radical change, nor did it acknowledge any need to
harmonize its assertion with the decades of federal judicial holdings recognizing the discretion of district courts in matters related to certification,
including multiple statements by the Court itself.11 Rather, the majority
spoke in a register that suggested it did not believe it was saying anything
surprising.
To paraphrase Professor David Shapiro, in a society where revolution is
not the order of the day, it would disserve the drafters of the Federal Rules
to impute a revolutionary purpose to unremarkable language.12 A ruling that
lower federal courts lack discretion in deciding whether a suit should be
certified for class treatment would be revolutionary, and a careful examination of the majority’s discussion of Rule 23 in Shady Grove makes clear that
the ruling calls for no such revolution.
This Article undertakes three tasks. Part I examines the abuse of discretion standard in class certification and its place in broader academic and
judicial discussions about the nature of procedural discretion. Part II then
sets forth a descriptive account of the discretion that federal courts have
understood themselves to possess in class certification proceedings under
modern Rule 23, and it attempts to develop a useful taxonomy in describing
the different modes in which that discretion has operated. My focus is legal
doctrine as manifested in reported judicial decisions, an incomplete source
8 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
9 Id. at 1437-38.
10 Id. at 1438.
11 See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki,

442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979) (“The certification of a nationwide
class, like most issues arising under Rule 23, is committed in the first instance to the discretion of
the district court.”).
12 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV .
921, 941-42 (1992) (discussing judicial resistance to change imposed by the plain language of
statutes).
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for discerning the actual practice of trial courts, but still indispensable in
assessing the parameters within which that practice has unfolded. This
overview is the product of close analysis of approximately one hundred class
action rulings that discuss the nature of discretion in class certification,
drawn, in turn, from the review of a larger universe of cases assembled with
the help of an invaluable research assistant. I make no claim that the results
are comprehensive, but I believe that they make possible a representative
account of the range and types of discretion that lower federal courts have
understood themselves to possess when considering certification requests.
With this body of material set forth for discussion, Part III provides an
argument about the systemic function of discretion in class certification and
the institutional implications of different species of discretion in the
certification process. Part III also reexamines the Shady Grove decision in
light of the preceding discussion, asking how much past practice in class
adjudication the ruling unsettles. The answer to that question is: not much.
Shady Grove can be harmonized with the large body of discretionary practice
undertaken by lower federal courts in class certification proceedings, and
there is reason to hope that this harmonization will prompt more active
attention to the nature and boundaries of lower court discretion in class
action litigation going forward.
I. THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD IN CLASS CERTIFICATION
The classic discussion of procedural discretion and appellate review in
the academic literature comes from Judge Henry Friendly’s canonical
lecture Indiscretion About Discretion.13 Throughout that essay, Judge Friendly
emphasizes the need to distinguish between respective areas of competence
and systemic concerns when defining the relationship between trial courts
and appellate courts in discretionary matters.14 Determinations that benefit
from “the trial court’s superior opportunities to reach a correct result”
through direct contact with parties, witnesses, and events are more appropriate recipients of wide discretionary berth, as are those situations that
require a balancing of factors “so numerous, variable and subtle that the
fashioning of rigid rules would be more likely to impair [the trial judge’s]
ability to deal fairly with a particular problem than to lead to a just result.”15
13 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982). Judge Friendly
drew upon Professor Rosenberg’s important treatment of the issue in Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial
Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971).
14 See generally Friendly, supra note 13.
15 Id. at 760 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d 41, 44 (7th Cir.
1975) (Stevens, J.)).
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On the other end of his spectrum, Judge Friendly places those cases in
which “Congress has declared a national policy and enlisted the aid of the
courts’ equity powers in its enforcement”—circumstances where “the need
for uniformity and predictability demand thorough appellate review.”16 This
analytical framework, placing matters that largely concern factual determinations in opposition to matters involving substantive legal policy, is now
regularly incorporated into discussions about judicial discretion. The
distinction tracks and expands upon the terms “primary discretion” and
“secondary discretion” that Professor Rosenberg had earlier introduced into
the literature and that are still in use.17
It is worth noting how Judge Friendly uses this analytical framework in
his published lecture. The Judge saw courts exhibiting a lack of appreciation
for the substantive policy implications of their procedural rulings. But this
did not lead him to conclude that the ability of courts to exercise judgment
should be reduced by more strictly defined legislative rules. Rather, Judge
Friendly emphasizes the distinction, often lost, between the overall role of
discretion in a judicial system and the prerogative of trial courts, as opposed
to appellate courts, in exercising that discretion:
A good deal of confusion has been generated by failure to distinguish
between two uses of the word “discretion.” The one with which I primarily
concern myself today, namely how far an appellate court is bound to sustain
rulings of the trial judge which it disapproves but does not consider to be
outside the ball park—a question of the allocation of an admitted power
within the judicial system—is quite different from the question whether, as
a normative matter, it is wise for lawmakers to insist on rigid rules in the
interest of certainty, no matter how harshly these may operate in some cases,
and whether it is not better to prescribe accordion-like standards that afford
the courts some dispensing powers to accomplish what they perceive to be
justice. To say the latter does not necessarily entail that such discretionary
power should be vested predominantly in the trial court rather than in the
entire judicial system.18

Indiscretion About Discretion urges an analytical shift toward appellate
constraints in the administration of those flexible standards that have
substantive policy implications. In Judge Friendly’s view, “broad judicial
16
17

Id. at 783-84.
See Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 637 (defining “primary discretion” as the power of courts to
make judgments free from “decision-constraining rules,” and “secondary discretion” as a limitation
on the error-correcting function of lower courts in a multilevel court system).
18 Friendly, supra note 13, at 754-55.
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review is necessary” in such cases “to preserve the most basic principle of
jurisprudence” that “we must act alike in all cases of like nature.”19
A year following the publication of his lecture, with his thoughts in this
area presumably sharpened by the exercise, Judge Friendly had the opportunity to write his views into law. In Abrams v. Interco Inc., Judge Friendly
penned an opinion agreeing with a district court that problems of notice and
manageability made a nationwide class inappropriate.20 Though affirming
the denial of certification, the Judge took the occasion to discount the
relevance of the abuse of discretion standard to questions of class certification:
Abuse of discretion can be found far more readily on appeals from the denial
or grant of class action status than where the issue is, for example, the
curtailment of cross-examination or the grant or denial of a continuance. . . . While no two cases will be exactly alike, a court of appeals can
no more tolerate divergence by a district judge from the principles it has
developed on this subject than it would under a standard of full review—
and this even though the district judge has adduced what would be plausible
grounds for his ruling if the issue were arising for the first time. Except to
the extent that the ruling is based on determinations of fact . . . or where
the trial judge’s experience in the instant case or in similar cases has given
him a degree of knowledge superior to that of appellate judges, as often
occurs, review of class action determinations for “abuse of discretion”
[would] not differ greatly from review for error.21

Judge Friendly’s formulation continues to shape the case law in the Second
Circuit, though in a strangely altered form: that circuit now maintains that
appellate courts are “noticeably less deferential when the district court has
denied class status than when it has certified a class.”22 Why an appellate
court should show greater deference in its review of an order granting

19
20
21
22

Id. at 758.
719 F.2d 23, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 28.
Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003) (alterations omitted); see
also Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Parker, 331
F.3d at 18) (“When reviewing a denial of class certification, we accord the district court noticeably
less deference than when we review a grant of certification.”), overruled on other grounds by
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2008).
The Vermont Supreme Court has politely disassociated itself from this unbalanced formulation of
the standard. See Salatino v. Chase, 939 A.2d 482, 485 (Vt. 2007) (“We . . . decline to construe
Vermont Rule 23 as the Second Circuit construed the analogous federal rule . . . .”).
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certification than in its review of an order denying certification is not
apparent.23
Other federal courts of appeals have exhibited a range of approaches
when defining the procedural discretion that district courts enjoy in the
class certification process. The practice of giving deference on the highly
fact-bound components of the certification analysis is widespread and
apparently uncontroversial, as Judge Friendly argued it should be. For
example, in a 1976 ruling, Hornreich v. Plant Industries, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit upheld a district court’s denial of certification in a shareholder
derivative suit on adequacy of representation grounds.24 Explaining that
“[d]etermination of right to bring a class action . . . is in the considered
discretion of the trial court,” the Ninth Circuit observed that “the evidence
is not wholly undisputed” and “there is a possibility that some of the facts
[regarding adequacy] might not in themselves prevent a derivative suit.”25
Nonetheless, the court held that, “when considered in totality, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s claim
to proceed.”26 Nearly thirty-five years later, the Eighth Circuit employed a
similar standard in Rattray v. Woodbury County, upholding a district court’s
finding that a plaintiff ’s significant delay in seeking class certification had
revealed the plaintiff and her lawyers to be inadequate class representatives.27
“Having worked with counsel for more than a year in this case,” the court
explained, “the district court has a better vantage point from which to
determine whether the delay in moving for certification suggests that
[plaintiff ’s] counsel would not effectively pursue the interests of absent class

23 The proposition appears to trace back to Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993).
Robidoux mistakenly cites Abrams as already imposing this distinction between review of orders
granting certification and review of orders denying certification, and it offers no further analysis
for why this distinction is appropriate or desirable. Id. at 935. There is no basis for such a procertification distinction in the text of Rule 23 itself, and any argument that the underlying law in a
given case strongly favors certification would have to operate on a substance-specific rather than a
trans-substantive basis. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1067 (2013) (discussing the potential role of the underlying substantive
law in shaping the actions of a court in complex litigation).
Robidoux also carries forward Judge Friendly’s observation that nondeferential review of class
certification is warranted where appellate courts “have built a body of case law with respect to class
action status.” 987 F.2d at 935. That is a defensible approach to appellate review of certification
decisions (though not the only one, as the cases in this Part demonstrate), but it offers no support
for a distinction between appellate review of certification grants and review of certification denials,
as the Robidoux court seemed to believe.
24 535 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1976).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 614 F.3d 831, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2010).
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members.”28 Appellate courts have shown similar deference to district courts
on questions of manageability, provided that the trial judge’s ruling is
undergirded by a careful examination of the issue,29 and on questions of
commonality and predominance when the necessary judgments involve a
close examination of ambiguous facts.30
Appellate courts have also given deference on certification questions that
implicate broader issues of procedural or legislative policy—the types of
cases for which Judge Friendly argued that trial courts should have circumscribed authority. In one recent ruling, Shook v. Board of County Commissioners
of El Paso,31 the Tenth Circuit embraced this species of deference in unusually
explicit terms. The case involved a 23(b)(2) action for injunctive relief filed
on behalf of mentally ill inmates in a Colorado county jail who alleged
unconstitutional confinement conditions and inadequate care.32 The trial
judge refused to certify, finding that the breadth with which the plaintiffs
had defined the class presented difficulties in crafting a standard of care
applicable to all class members and introduced too many questions that
would depend upon members’ individual circumstances. 33 The appellate
court found these to be acceptable grounds for the district court’s denial of
class certification, despite substantial room for disagreement about its
conclusions. In affirming the denial of class certification, the Tenth Circuit
explicitly reserved the possibility that another district court might come to a
different conclusion in a future case, stating“[w]hile we very well may have
made a different decision had the issue been presented to us as an initial
matter, and while other district courts perhaps could have chosen, or could
choose, to certify similar classes, we cannot say that the district court’s
assessment was beyond the pale.”34 In reviewing the obstacles to certification
28 Id. at 836; see also De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., 497 F.3d 1214, 1220-21
(11th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s certification and deferring to its decision to delay
resolving a dispute about the adequacy of the named representatives until a fuller factual record
was developed).
29 See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 998, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986) (expressing “misgivings” about the manageability of a nationwide asbestos abatement suit, but affirming class
certification because “[m]anageability is a practical problem, one with which a district court
generally has a greater degree of expertise and familiarity than does an appellate court”).
30 See, e.g., Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 640-41 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming a district court’s
denial of certification in a securities action, despite some errors of law in framing questions under
Rule 23(a), because “the district court is in the best position to determine whether the complaints
of investors who rely on different corporate statements are sufficiently similar to warrant class
certification”).
31 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 2008).
32 Id. at 600-01.
33 Id. at 602-03.
34 Id. at 603-04.
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that the trial judge identified, the court acknowledged that “the sorts of
problems highlighted by the district court may have been mitigated, or
perhaps avoided, by the use of subclasses,”35 but the Supreme Court has
placed the onus of proposing subclasses on the party seeking certification,36
and the Shook court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to consider the issue sua sponte.37 An appellate court’s role, the
Tenth Circuit found, is to ask “whether the district court’s decision ‘exceeded
the bounds of permissible choice,’ a standard that . . . acknowledges the
possibility that polar opposite decisions may both fall within the ‘range of
possible outcomes the facts and law at issue can fairly support.’”38
Shook’s statement of appellate deference to trial court discretion is one of
the broadest I have discovered in a case where certification turns on questions of underlying substantive policy rather than on factual disputes or
management problems. But it does not stand alone. Many circuits have
found that broad policy considerations call for discretion in the certification
decision, often through the mechanism of the superiority requirement, and
they have concluded that appellate courts should review such discretion
deferentially.
Several such rulings may be found in cases arising under the federal
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), a statute that played a significant role in
early interpretations of the 1966 version of Rule 23. Under the original
version of the Act enacted in 1968, creditors were subject to statutory
damages for each instance in which they failed to disclose specified information “to any person”39—a provision that opened the door to crushing
aggregate liability in some cases. When the dangers of the TILA became
apparent, Congress amended the statute to set a $500,000 cap on total
recovery in class action proceedings and to give courts leeway to determine
appropriate total damages, taking into account “among other relevant
35
36
37

Id. at 606.
See id. at 607 (citing U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 408 (1980)).
See id. (“While the district court could have sua sponte suggested subclassing as a possible
solution to Rule 23(b)(2) problems, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts do not bear any
obligation to do so . . . .”). As other courts have pointed out, Geraghty affirmed the portion of the
Third Circuit ruling that required the district court on remand to consider the issue of subclasses.
See, e.g., Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“While the court need
not take initiative, Geraghty holds, it must weigh the possibility of subclasses or of certifying a
narrower class.”). “[T]he burden of constructing subclasses”—that is, determining what specific
subclasses might resolve potential obstacles to certification—falls exclusively on the parties.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 408.
38 Shook, 543 F.3d at 610 (quoting United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir.
2007)).
39 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1968), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
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factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and
persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources of the
creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which
the creditor’s failure of compliance was intentional.”40 Under these amendments,
Congress placed its imprimatur upon the use of the class action to enforce
the TILA, but it invited courts to use their judgment in determining appropriate damages and, by implication, whether class treatment was appropriate
at all. Congress, in other words, had “declared a national policy and enlisted
the aid of the courts’ equity powers in its enforcement”—the sort of circumstance that Judge Friendly believed called for “uniformity and predictability”
by way of “thorough appellate review.”41
But several circuits followed a different path, treating district court certification rulings in TILA cases with deference and exhibiting tolerance for
a lack of strict uniformity. Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc.42 is one such
case. In Watkins, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the decision of a district court
to deny certification of a class comprising about one thousand customers of
a small Michigan retailer who claimed TILA violations in the wording of a
retail credit sales contract.43 The district court found these violations to be
only technical in nature, emphasized that customers had suffered no actual
damages, and noted that the company had quickly remedied the error after
the violation was called to its attention.44 In light of these facts, the trial
judge concluded that “maintenance of the class action . . . [was] an
unnecessary overreaction to the violation here” and hence not a superior
method of granting relief under Rule 23(b)(3).45 The Sixth Circuit affirmed,
but only because of the deference it believed was due to the district court.
“[T]he technical nature of the violations may well argue in favor of the
appropriateness of the class action here,” the court explained, as class
certification might be necessary to call violations to the attention of consumers who would otherwise never learn of them.46 Characterizing these
arguments as “persuasive,” the court said that “[w]ere the certification issue
before us de novo we may very well have certified the class.”47 Reversing the
district court’s decision, however, would “as a practical matter” constitute a
holding that certification is required in all cases, “effectively negat[ing] the
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
Friendly, supra note 13, at 783-84.
618 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 403-04.
Id. at 404.
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discretion of a district court to certify a class.”48 The court therefore affirmed,
reiterating the general proposition that TILA class actions are “desirable and
should be encouraged” and holding that “class certification should be denied
only in a case involving technical violations and only where the district
court, in the exercise of discretion, believes that certification is unwarranted.”49
Despite setting forth a broad statement about legislative policy, the
Sixth Circuit preserved a role for district courts to exercise discretion in
determining when the purposes of the TILA would be furthered by class
certification in a given case. Other circuits followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead
on this point,50 and, in some cases, TILA rulings on appellate deference
were translated to disputes involving other substantive legal regimes.51
Of course, appellate courts have also reviewed certification decisions
more aggressively in cases implicating substantive law questions or broad
disputes over aggregation policy. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, a
number of circuits adopted strong presumptions in favor of class treatment
in civil rights cases, and they exercised invasive review when district courts
denied certification in circumstances that undermined that substantive
commitment.52 The courts of appeals have also articulated strong aggregation policies in some commercial areas and shown little deference when
district courts have failed to enforce those policies. Thus in Kirkpatrick v.
J.C. Bradford & Co., the Eleventh Circuit reversed the order of a district
court denying class certification on predominance and adequacy grounds in
a securities action in which the plaintiffs claimed that a brokerage house had

48
49
50

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Shroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming the district court’s denial of certification in a case involving approximately five hundred home
purchasers given documents by a title company alleged to contain TILA violations and giving the
district court discretion to determine when a class action is a “superior” remedy in cases involving
technical TILA violations).
51 For example, the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Shroder played a role in another Eleventh Circuit case, Hines v. Widnall, involving alleged violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 334 F.3d 1253, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a denial of
certification based on a lack of typicality, emphasizing that “whether, in reviewing the record de
novo, we would certify the class is of no consequence” and that the district court’s conclusions
about typicality were “within the range of permissible choice and thus not a clear error of
judgment.” Id. at 1257.
52 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1982) (articulating a strong presumption “in favor of making [the class procedure] available to litigants
when possible” in a student civil rights case); Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1378 (8th Cir. 1980)
(insisting that Rule 23(b)(2) “must be read liberally in the context of civil rights suits,” and that
“[t]his principle of construction limits the district court’s discretion”).
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circulated misleading information concerning an oil and gas fund that later
collapsed.53
The appellate court began by reversing the district court on a merits
question, finding that plaintiffs were entitled to pursue a fraud-on-the-market
theory based on a common course of misleading statements issued by the
fund and its agents.54 Rather than remanding for reconsideration of the
predominance analysis in light of this revised standard, the appellate court
found that “[i]n view of the overwhelming number of common factual and
legal issues presented by plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims . . . the mere
presence of the factual issue of individual reliance could not render the
claims unsuitable for class treatment.”55 The Eleventh Circuit determined
that it was appropriate to set a uniform policy on aggregation where the
complaint “alleges a single conspiracy and fraudulent scheme against a large
number of individuals” and it constrained the discretion of trial courts to
deny certification in such cases.56 The court also found that the district
court had applied an erroneous standard in assessing the adequacy of the
named plaintiffs to represent the class.57 Here, in contrast, it did remand for
a new determination by the district court after correcting the adequacy
standard, explaining that “[i]n contrast to the more strictly legal questions
presented by the [fraud-on-the-market and predominance issues], the
adequacy of class representation is primarily a factual issue that is best left
for determination by the district court.”58
Finally, Antonin Scalia had an opportunity to speak about the relationship
between trial and appellate courts in matters relating to discretion and class
certification in a dispute that he heard while a judge on the D.C. Circuit.
The views he expressed in that case are an important point of reference in
assessing the decision he later authored in Shady Grove, as Part III explains.
In Fink v. National Savings & Trust Co., the D.C. Circuit, per Judge Abner
Mikva, reversed several rulings of a district judge in an ERISA dispute.59
On the question of class certification, Judge Mikva wrote that the trial court
had abused its discretion when it denied class certification on typicality and
53
54

827 F.2d 718, 720-21, 728 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 722 (“We cannot agree, however, with the court’s rejection of the fraud-on-themarket theory as a basis for class action treatment.”).
55 Id. at 724-25.
56 Id. at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 The district court required class representatives to “demonstrate . . . that individually
they will pursue with vigor the legal claims of the class,” a prerequisite that the appellate court
found did “not vindicate the policies and purposes of Rule 23” nor the substantive interests of the
underlying regulatory scheme. Id. at 727.
58 Id. at 728.
59 772 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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adequacy grounds without conducting any hearings or making any findings,
despite the presence of substantial and contested factual issues, leaving the
appellate court with no meaningful basis to conduct its review.60 Judge
Scalia strenuously objected, arguing that this form of appellate review
intruded inappropriately upon the district court’s discretionary control over
class certification.61 Reminding the majority “that the District Court has
broad discretion in determining whether a suit should proceed as a class
action,” Judge Scalia offered a different view of the factual record.62 Certain
“undisputed facts” suggested the possibility of defenses peculiar to the
named representatives and imperfectly aligned interests within the class, he
explained, and these potential obstacles to certification were “more than
enough to prevent our finding the District Court’s refusal to certify [on
typicality and adequacy grounds] an abuse of discretion.”63 The fact that the
trial court had not identified these potential obstacles to certification as the
basis of its holding did not change the analysis, in Judge Scalia’s view.64 It
was enough that the trial court would have been acting within the permissible bounds of its discretion had it relied upon these features of the suit to
deny certification. 65 Reversing under those conditions, Judge Scalia said,
“represent[ed] . . . a deep encroachment upon the domain of the District
Court.”66
As framed by Judge Scalia, the contested certification questions in Fink
were rooted in core questions of substantive law and aggregation policy:
whether the possibility that the named plaintiffs “might be subject to
defenses of estoppel inapplicable to other class members” or “might have
significantly different interests” from other class members would authorize a
district court to exercise discretion in declining to certify, a decision that
would in turn be insulated from invasive appellate scrutiny.67 His insistence
upon the domain of the trial court in such matters places him solidly on the
deferential end of the spectrum, contra Judge Friendly’s more appellatecentered approach. As Part III explains, that statement of principle would
be inconsistent with an excessively broad reading of Justice Scalia’s later
opinion in Shady Grove.

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 960.
Id. at 965 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 964-65.
Id.
Id. at 965.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF DISCRETION UNDER MODERN RULE 23
A. The Period of Transition Following the 1966 Revisions and
Experimentation in the Face of Uncertainty
In the years following the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, federal courts
faced the task of implementing an entirely new type of procedural mechanism and, in the case of Rule 23(b)(3), an entirely new type of proceeding.
Of necessity, they engaged in experimentation, becoming acquainted with
the operation of the new Rule and determining what types of representative
suits would be possible under its provisions. In undertaking this effort, the
lower federal courts were exercising a species of discretion, and some of
them explicitly described their efforts in that language.
For example, in one federal securities action, Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal
Basic Industries, Inc., filed in 1968, Judge William Doyle of the District of
Colorado had to decide whether a class action could proceed over claims of
misrepresentation in the merger of two mineral and construction companies.68 The action carried the potential for “tremendous” damages,69 and
although the court believed “the basic requisites for a class action [we]re
satisfied,” it had questions about the merits of the fraud claim and concerns
about the expense that plaintiffs would assume if the court were “to set all
of the class action machinery in motion at [that] time.”70 The court thus
decided that it would be “the better part of discretion” to defer notifying
class members of the proceeding and begin with “a bifurcated trial on the
threshold issues at least before proceeding further.”71 Only if the plaintiffs’
claims survived this initial test would they “notify the members of the class
and go on from there.”72 The court was candid in saying that it was uncertain about its experiment: “We are aware, of course, that the suggested
approach is somewhat innovative, but the Rule 23 procedure itself is new
and requires such efforts.”73 As another judge hearing a securities action in
the Southern District of New York had explained a few years earlier, the
newly revised Rule “added . . . some devices to aid in the management of ”
class actions, and those tools could “provide[] the flexibility to permit [an]
action to proceed” even where a lack of strict uniformity among claimants

68
69
70
71
72
73

326 F. Supp. 98, 100-01 (D. Colo. 1971).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“might have led to a dismissal of a class action under the old rule.”74 And, of
course, the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, which
imposed some specific constraints on innovation by district courts, arose out
of a trial judge’s extensive efforts to make sense of the appellate direction it
was receiving in crafting an effective and practicable mechanism for recovery
in a securities dispute.75 Lower federal courts hearing class actions in the
years immediately following the 1966 amendments necessarily operated in
an experimental mode.
Experimentation, in turn, provided the practical and doctrinal
knowledge from which the courts of appeals would sometimes craft more
constraining rules. A ruling by the Second Circuit in a Rule 23(b)(3)
securities class action, issued by a panel that included Judge Friendly, is
illustrative. The case, Korn v. Franchard Corp., involved a prospectus issued
by the general partners in a real estate venture. 76 Shareholders in the
venture alleged that the prospectus contained fraudulent and misleading
statements. 77 The district court concluded that typicality, adequacy of
representation, and predominance all made certification inappropriate for
the issue of shareholder reliance on the prospectus.78 The court of appeals
reversed, finding that “where, as here, there is a single written document
charged with important omissions,”79 the case for certification is so strong
that “a district judge could not decide against allowing a class action without
abusing his discretion.” 80 The court canvassed recent securities rulings
presenting similar facts and the approaches those courts had taken to the
reliance question, finding a strong presumption that “common questions
predominate” in such cases.81
We do not cite these formulations to tell the District Court that it should or
must follow any of them. Our purpose is only to show that, though many
paths have been taken, the federal courts have concurred in adopting procedures and rules which can reduce the difficulties of showing individual
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
417 U.S. 156, 161-69 (1974).
456 F.2d 1206, 1207 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id.
Id. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1213. In a related study, Professor Issacharoff examined the development of the doctrine of reliance in consumer protection law and argued that “the amenability of certain claims to
aggregate treatment turns on a clarification of the substantive standards for reliance,” concluding
that the presence of a formal reliance requirement in the substantive law need not impede class
certification in the typical case. Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class
Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2000).
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reliance. . . . It may be, as some recent prophecies have it, that future
history will pulverize the current hope of avoiding unduly cumbersome
litigation on the reliance phase of these 10b-5 suits, but we are not yet sure
enough of that speculation to insist, as a court applying existing Rule 23, that
the present course must be sharply revised—at least not on the relatively
simple facts of this case.82

The court of appeals felt confident enough in the treatment of reliance that
had emerged through experimentation in these other cases that it declined
to remand the case after correcting the district court’s other errors, concluding
that it was appropriate in this area of substantive law to impose a legal rule
that left little room for trial-level discretion.83
As the ensuing years made clear, discretion to experiment cannot
amount to a suspension of the Rule’s requirements, nor can a trial court
defer a robust certification inquiry in the name of experimentation. The
1966 version of Rule 23(c)(1)(C) expressly invited district courts to make
“conditional” determinations, and some courts relied upon that language to
authorize class actions at an early stage of the proceedings without full
confidence that an action was appropriate for class treatment.84 Even where
this use of conditional certification reflected genuine diligence on the part
of the trial court,85 rather than the kind of “certify now and worry later”
approach that eventually came under heavy criticism,86 the practice had the
82
83
84

Korn, 456 F.2d at 1213.
Id. at 1208.
See, e.g., Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (“Determinations of class
action are only conditional and may always be altered or amended before a decision on the merits.”
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1))); Ridgeway v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 134, 74
F.R.D. 597, 601, 604 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (relying upon Rule 23(c)(1) to enter a “conditional order” of
certification despite potential commonality problems, which could be “winnow[ed] out” at later
stages of the proceeding).
85 One prominent example of this is Judge William Schwarzer’s opinion in Harriss v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Judge William Schwarzer, a noted
expert in the fields of procedure and judicial administration, invoked the language of former Rule
23(c)(1)(C) to explain that conditional certification was “nothing more than a tentative determination for procedural purposes” that reserved to the court the opportunity to “determine whether
any further proceedings directed to the issue of relief, if any, may be maintained as a class action”
and address “such questions as subclassing, notice and intervention.” Id. at 47.
86 The quoted language is from Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex.
2000), a significant ruling that reined in certification practices by trial courts in Texas. For another
example of an appellate ruling from the same era in which the court disapproved of the aggressive
use of conditional certification, see Andrews v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 1014, 1019, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996),
abrogated on other grounds by Douglas Asphault Co. v. QORE, Inc., 657 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2011), in
which the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court’s certification of a massive worldwide class
action against telecom companies for their hosting of 900-number telemarketing programs alleged
to constitute illegal gambling. In response to concerns about the management of the proceeding,
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capacity to impose settlement pressure on defendants and undermine the
interests of plaintiffs in a manner exceeding the legitimate scope of the
Rule’s authority. The 2003 amendments to Rule 23 therefore eliminated all
reference to conditional certification, with the Advisory Committee’s note
emphasizing that “[a] court that is not satisfied that the requirements of
Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.”87
Experimentation in class certification, however, is not exclusively an
artifact of the period following the 1966 amendments, nor need it indicate
that district courts have shown a lack of diligence when resolving tough
questions. Lower federal courts have found that discretion to experiment is
sometimes necessary when they are presented with novel and intractable
litigation challenges. A 1993 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit helps make this point. In Central Wesleyan College v. W.R.
Grace & Co., an asbestos case arising from the abatement and property
damage phase of that decades-long litigation, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a
district court’s decision to certify a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(3) of
all public and private colleges and universities that owned buildings containing friable asbestos, which federal law required them to remove.88 There
were many liability issues common to the class, but also serious questions
about predominance and manageability, coupled with a history of similar
litigation in the Third Circuit in a nationwide damages action on behalf of
public school districts that gave reason for skepticism.89 Having recounted
that history, the Fourth Circuit noted that it reviewed the district court’s
the district court insisted that it “can and will assemble the resources that [the proceeding]
requires,” but the court of appeals found this assurance inadequate to meet threshold certification
requirements and inappropriate insofar as it suggested certifying without regard to the impact
upon judicial economy. Id. at 1025.
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s note to the 2003 amendments. Prior to its
amendment, Judge Marvin Frankel foresaw the potential for Rule 23(c)(1)(C) to cause mischief
and treated the provision with caution, acknowledging that it “may be a source of some comfort to
the judge confronting the pressure to rule in some fashion when he can perceive only dimly or not
at all the dimensions of the material facts,” but that “we should avoid finding too much comfort in
this assurance that there will be time to correct the mistakes.” Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary
Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 42 (1968).
88 6 F.3d 177, 190 (4th Cir. 1993).
89 Id. at 182. The Third Circuit had affirmed the certification of a nationwide class action for
compensatory damages in In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 998-99 (3d Cir. 1986). Six
years later, the Third Circuit reported in a subsequent appeal that “numerous delays” had plagued
preparations for trial, and the district court was only prepared to move forward on a trial
regarding conspiracy and concert of action that was divided across several trials with discrete
groups of defendants “[i]n order to keep trial manageable.” In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d
764, 772 (3d Cir. 1992). In that same appeal, the district judge was removed from the case because
of an appearance of partiality created by his attendance at a plaintiff-centric conference, creating
yet more challenges in bringing the case to trial. Id. at 778-88.
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ruling “with the caution befitting contemplation of any experimental
mechanism.”90 Even so, the court affirmed.91
The district court had expressly invoked the conditional certification
provision of old Rule 23(c)(1)(C) in its order, a point that the Fourth Circuit
emphasized in explaining its affirmance.92 Some factual questions remained
to be answered about the suitability of the named plaintiff to represent the
entire class of defendants, questions as to which the district court “defer[red] a final decision” pending later discovery to determine which
products were installed in which institutions.93 Under currently controlling
authority, a district court would need to satisfy itself that the requirements
of Rule 23 were satisfied prior to certifying the class, with sufficient discovery
in the certification hearing to support a “rigorous analysis.”94 That component of the district court’s ruling probably does not survive subsequent
doctrinal developments.
But the primary role that the Fourth Circuit recognized for experimentation in class certification did not concern the district court’s deferral of
questions relating to typicality and adequacy. Rather, the greatest source of
concern related to the manageability of large asbestos proceedings and the
systemic benefit that class certification would provide when measured
against other forms of consolidation—questions that lower federal courts
were struggling to answer at the time. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged
the troubled history of the school district litigation as a cautionary tale but
also believed that the district court’s certification was based on a reasonable
hope that “[l]essons . . . have been learned from the litigation in Philadelphia,”
and that the suit before it represented “an opportunity to apply” those
lessons.95 That being so, the appeals court held the certification order fell
within the district court’s “considerable discretion” to employ the class
device “to assist in resolving asbestos litigation nationwide and to avoid
some of the enormous waste of resources that could accompany individual
litigation.”96
These efforts to apply the class mechanism to property damage claims
cannot claim wild success. The Supreme Court’s two major statements on

90
91
92

Cent. Wesleyan Coll., 6 F.3d at 183.
Id. at 190.
See id. at 186 (“The tentative, limited nature of the conditional certification also counsels
in favor of affirmance.”).
93 Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628, 642 (D.S.C. 1992).
94 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
95 Cent. Wesleyan Coll., 6 F.3d at 186.
96 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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asbestos litigation did not address property damage claims directly,97 but
the limits they imposed would apply in equal measure in such cases, and the
subsequent history of property claims in the federal courts is one of bankruptcy rather than class litigation.98 Asbestos claims are perhaps the most
acute example of what Judge Friendly described as a specific area of substantive litigation in which discretion comes to be constrained by the
articulation of controlling principles by appellate courts.99 Even in such a
case, however, discretion to experiment plays a role, providing practical
experience with litigation dynamics and an opportunity to explore doctrinal
solutions. It is this type of expertise that can eventually make clear the need
for constraints upon discretion.
B. Management of Class Proceedings
Rule 23(b)(3) expressly requires the trial court to consider “the likely
difficulties in managing a class action”100 in a proceeding certified under that
provision—a requirement normally associated with the workability of a trial
and associated liability and damages determinations. Distinct from that type
of “manageability” concern is the more prosaic management of the operations of a class proceeding on a day-to-day basis, including the behavior of
the participating lawyers and parties. Discretion in this sort of internal
management of class proceedings has always been recognized as a necessary
feature of modern Rule 23. 101 Judge Marvin E. Frankel explored this
proposition in his Preliminary Observations, published shortly after the 1966
revisions. In that essay, he introduces his analysis of select provisions of the
new Rule in the following terms:

97 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999) (holding a (b)(1)(B) mandatory
settlement class could not be used to settle asbestos litigation); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1996) (rejecting a (b)(3) settlement class used to resolve asbestos litigation).
98 See, e.g., In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 314-15 (3d Cir. 2013) (detailing the proliferation of lawsuits against the defendant in Central Wesleyan College that ultimately led the company
to seek protection and discharge in bankruptcy).
99 See Friendly, supra note 13, at 754-55 (suggesting that certain areas of law may require
“rigid rules” to promote the “interest of certainty”).
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
101 The Sixth Circuit has suggested a link between the discretion of district courts in matters
relating to class certification and “the inherent power [of a trial court] to manage and control its
own pending litigation.” Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2007). This
framing of the issue appears to imply a broad formulation of the deference owed the district court
in the exercise of that discretion. See id. at 559-60 (“The district court’s decision certifying the
class is subject to a very limited review and will be reversed only upon a strong showing that the
district court’s decision was a clear abuse of discretion.” (quoting Olden v. Lafarge Corp., 383 F.3d
495, 507 (6th Cir. 2004))).
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The revisions in Rule 23 effective July 1, 1966, effect broad and challenging
innovations. The dimensions of the changes cannot possibly be stated in
certain detail at this early stage of their existence. The Rule—quite deliberately, I think—tends to ask more questions than it answers. It is neither a
set of prescriptions nor a blue print. It is, rather, a broad outline of general
policies and directions. As the commentators have said, it confides to the
district judges a broad range of discretion. And this means, as you all know
so well, not that we’re about to get drunk with power, but that we’ve been
challenged to piece out a huge body of procedural common law by giving all
the hard labor and creative imagination we can muster for this purpose.102

Judge Frankel went on to identify a range of issues, including class notice
and the timing of the certification hearing, that would require creativity and
adaptability from courts applying the new rule.103
These predictions were quickly reflected in the case law. Matters involving the form and content of notice to the class were regularly recognized as
requiring discretion on the part of trial courts. In Gold Strike Stamp Co. v.
Christensen, one of the early appellate rulings under the new Rule, the Tenth
Circuit denied a request for mandamus intervention following a district
court’s order certifying an antitrust class under Rule 23(b)(3) and directing
that notice be provided to the class members.104 Assessing the content of the
notice, the appellate court found that the trial judge had included all the
information expressly required by Rule 23 along with enough additional
guidance to allow class members to make a decision without being overwhelmed
with detail.105 As the court explained, “the Rule places the control of class
actions and in particular the issuance of notice to members of the class
under the control and thus the discretion of the trial judge,” calling for a
light hand in any appellate review.106

102
103

Frankel, supra note 87, at 39 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 40-41 (noting that amended Rule 23 does not specifically address the problems
attendant to notice and timing, and calling on judges to answer these questions in the particular
circumstances); see also Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1561, 1601-02 (2003) (describing the period following the 1966 revision to Rule 23 and explaining
that “from the start, the rule was heavily laden with discretionary elements”).
104 436 F.2d 791, 799 (10th Cir. 1970).
105 Id. at 798-99. This balance between pertinent information and clear, concise notice came
to be recognized by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules as a best practice of sufficient
importance to warrant codification in the 2003 amendments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)
advisory committee’s note to the 2003 amendments (specifying an expanded list of requirements
for the content of class notice and mandating that notice clearly and concisely state those materials
“in plain, easily understood language”).
106 Gold Strike Stamp, 436 F.2d at 799.
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The Supreme Court addressed questions of internal management in Gulf
Oil Co. v. Bernard, a case involving a broad district court order that limited
the ability of class counsel to communicate with the members of a Title VII
class. 107 Noting “the potential for abuse” in the powerful forces put in
motion by the class mechanism, the Court held that district courts require
broad discretion “to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.” 108 When
management orders are restrictive or invasive, they must “be based on a
clear record and specific findings” indicating a weighing of competing
interests, a requirement that the Court found not to be satisfied in the order
before it.109 Bernard remains the governing authority concerning restraints
on communication with class members, and it is regularly cited by lower
federal courts for the broad but bounded discretion that district courts enjoy
to manage the processes by which a class action is analyzed and conducted.110
C. Redefinition of the Class
The power of a district court to alter the definition or scope of a plaintiff ’s proposed class is also well established among the lower federal courts.
Much less widely appreciated is the imprimatur that the Supreme Court has
given to discretionary decisions on such matters. Califano v. Yamasaki
contains one of the Court’s most oft-cited statements on discretion in class
certification: “[M]ost issues arising under Rule 23[ are] committed in the
first instance to the discretion of the district court.”111 This statement is
typically offered as generic authority for the existence of discretion in the
certification analysis. 112 The passages from which the sentence is lifted,
however, are more specific. The Court in Yamasaki recognized two propositions: (1) that district courts presented with a putative nationwide class have
107
108
109
110

452 U.S. 89, 103-04 (1981).
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101-02.
See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The trial court has
broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class, but that discretion must be exercised within
the framework of Rule 23.” (citing Bernard, 452 U.S. at 100)).
111 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979).
112 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2562 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Yamasaki for the proposition that an appellate court
should not overturn a district court’s certification unless there is an error of law or abuse of
discretion); A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 477 & n.195 (2013) (citing Yamasaki to support the proposition that
“[e]ven in the class context, appellate courts are not in the position to provide de novo review of
factual evidence, giving their own assessments without regard to the findings of the district
court”).
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the discretion to certify a class of lesser scope, and (2) that courts may take
into account systemic considerations not specified in Rule 23 when deciding
whether to exercise that discretion.113
Yamasaki involved a consolidated pair of cases in which recipients of Social
Security benefits challenged an effort by the Social Security Administration
to recoup overpayments from beneficiaries by withholding future benefits
without first granting individual hearings to the affected recipients.114 In
one case, the plaintiffs sought a statewide class action for residents of
Hawaii, which the district court certified.115 In the other, Washington state
plaintiffs requested a nationwide class action.116 The district court granted
the request for certification, but it exempted from the class definition
residents of Hawaii and of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (where
another proceeding had been initiated), as well as any individuals who “had
participated as plaintiffs or members of a plaintiff class in litigation against
the Secretary on similar issues.”117
On appeal, the Secretary argued broadly that class certification was categorically inappropriate under the judicial review provisions of the Social
Security Act and, in the alternative, that a nationwide class was inappropriate
in a case of the type before the court.118 The Supreme Court rejected the
first argument, imposing a clear-statement rule that requires Congress to
exclude class relief expressly if it wishes a statute to exclude the possibility
of that tool.119 The Court treated the second argument as a variation on the
first—here, a request for a ruling that a nationwide class is categorically
inappropriate under Rule 23 itself in Social Security disputes of this kind—
and it rejected that request as well.120 But it was the categorical nature of
the argument that the Court rejected. The underlying challenge to the
suitability of such disputes to nationwide class treatment received more
sympathetic treatment:
We concede the force of the Secretary’s contentions that nationwide class
actions may have a detrimental effect by foreclosing adjudication by a number

113 See Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702-03 (“[A] federal court when asked to certify a nationwide
class should take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate . . . and that
certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the litigation of similar issues in
other judicial districts.”).
114 Id. at 684.
115 Id. at 687-88.
116 Id. at 689.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 698-99.
119 Id. at 700.
120 Id. at 700-01.
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of different courts and judges, and of increasing, in certain cases, the pressures on this Court’s docket. It often will be preferable to allow several
courts to pass on a given class claim in order to gain the benefit of adjudication by different courts in different factual contexts. For this reason, a federal court when asked to certify a nationwide class should take care to
ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate in the case before it, and
that certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the
litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts. But we decline to adopt
the extreme position that such a class may never be certified. The certification of a nationwide class, like most issues arising under Rule 23, is committed in the first instance to the discretion of the district court. On the facts
of this case we cannot conclude that the District Court in [the nationwide
case] abused that discretion, especially in light of its sensitivity to ongoing
litigation of the same issue in other districts, and the determination that
counsel was adequate to represent the class.121

Since the significance of this passage to the discretion of certifying courts
appears never to have been fully appreciated in the literature, the Court’s
analysis warrants careful exposition. In explaining its rejection of the
Secretary’s categorical argument about nationwide classes, the Court
emphasized that “[n]othing in Rule 23 . . . limits the geographical scope of
a class action that is brought in conformity with that Rule.”122 That is, the
Rule offers no express statement imposing such a limitation. Given the
posture of the Secretary’s claim, the Court could have taken this silence on
geography to indicate that the rule gives district courts no power to limit
the scope of a plaintiff ’s putative class action, so long as the suit is “brought
in conformity with” the provisions of Rule 23. But the Court did no such
thing.
Yamasaki recognizes discretion in the district court to determine the appropriate scope of a proposed class proceeding, even in a proceeding that
satisfies the express terms of the rule. The Secretary lost his appeal because
the district court had not “abused that discretion” given the steps it took to
avoid interference with other pending proceedings.123 In deciding when to
permit a nationwide injunctive class, Yamasaki explains, district courts
should take into account systemic considerations that are unaddressed in the
text of Rule 23(b)(2), including the possibility of “improper[] interfere[nce]
with the litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts.” 124 The
121
122
123
124

Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 702.
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question of how to assess the impropriety of such interference in quality
and degree in any given case is left to the discretion of future district
courts.125
Yamasaki was a (b)(2) action seeking an injunction, and one portion of
the Court’s analysis ties its holding to equitable principles concerning the
proper scope of injunctive relief, explaining that there is no cause for a
categorical prohibition on nationwide class actions in this type of Social
Security claim because “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the
extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the
plaintiff class.”126 The Court allowed for the possibility that a broad class
definition in an equitable proceeding might afford relief “more burdensome
than necessary to redress the complaining parties,”127 a circumstance that
would call for constraining the class. In other words, a (b)(2) injunctive
proceeding might create the prospect of unnecessary burdens on the
defendant and provoke systemic concerns about interference with parallel or
related court proceedings. These would both be grounds for a district court
to exercise discretion in certifying a narrower proceeding than the one
proposed by the plaintiff.128
Lower federal courts have not generally relied upon Yamasaki in exercising discretionary authority to reformulate a plaintiff ’s proposed class
definition. Instead, they have claimed that authority in a wide variety of
settings and treated it as a natural extension of their discretion to decide
whether to certify at all.
In its most basic form, a court’s modification of the class definition can
operate to harmonize the certified class with the actual course of the
125 In a damages class action brought under Rule 23(b)(3), these considerations may form a
part of the superiority analysis, which invites the court to consider “the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members” and “the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(B)-(C). No explicit license of this kind appears in Rule 23(b)(2).
126 Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702.
127 Id.
128 Rule 23(c) confirms the authority of a district court to issue orders that “define the class.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). There is room for debate as to whether Rule 23(c)(1)(B) is only a
housekeeping provision designed to ensure regularity between the class certification order, the
litigated proceeding, and any resulting judgment, or whether it confers authority upon the court to
shape the class according to its own judgment. Compare Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687
F.3d 583, 591-92 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying Rule 23(c)(1)(B) as a housekeeping provision to
“provid[e] the parties with clarity and assist[] class members in understanding their rights”), with
Pyke v. Cuomo, 209 F.R.D. 33, 38-40 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (employing Rule 23(c)(1)(B) as both a
housekeeping provision and an occasion to make judgments about the scope of the class). On
either reading, Yamasaki’s acknowledgment of extra-textual discretionary considerations is
significant for discussions of class scope.
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proceedings. In Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., for example, the Sixth Circuit
found that a putative nationwide class action instituted against an Ohio
medical clinic was overbroad.129 The court deemed the nationwide scope of
the class unnecessary in light of the narrow population of affected individuals—patients of a clinic that operated only in Ohio and West Virginia—and
observed that the trial court and the parties had focused their efforts only
on claims by Ohio citizens governed by Ohio law, raising questions about
whether the interests of any claimants outside Ohio were properly represented. 130 Nonetheless, rather than reversing the judgment below and
decertifying the class, the court deemed it appropriate instead “to amend
the class certification so that the class includes the named plaintiffs and
those similarly situated”131—a sua sponte modification that would “bring[]
the formal certification into conformity with the class definition that the
parties and the court below believed to have been certified.”132 In a similar
ruling issued shortly following the 1966 amendments, a Minnesota district
court hearing a constitutional challenge to a property seizure statute
rejected the class definition proposed by the plaintiff and adopted a modified definition that solved ascertainability problems and still permitted the
core of the plaintiff ’s challenge to be certified.133 The court noted: “The fact
that plaintiff ’s definition of the class needed modification does not require
dismissal of the class action” because “[a] court can, in its discretion under
the Rule, define a class in a manner which will allow utilization of the class
action procedure.”134
Federal courts have also reformulated class definitions in a more aggressive fashion, reshaping the action to resolve problems under Rule 23 and
authorize a proceeding that the court deems suitable for representative
treatment, even if the resulting action differs significantly from the one
proposed by the plaintiff. A ruling by Judge Colleen McMahon of the
Southern District of New York offers a useful illustration. In Maneely v. City
of Newburgh, plaintiff Maneely had been arrested on a misdemeanor charge
and subjected to a strip search that he believed to be unjustified.135 His
search allegedly happened pursuant to a city policy of subjecting all
arrestees to strip search without regard to whether there was reasonable

129
130
131
132
133
134
135

110 F.3d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1214.
Id.
Id. at 1215.
Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245, 249 (D. Minn. 1971).
Id.
208 F.R.D. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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suspicion to believe the arrestee possessed contraband or a weapon. 136
Maneely sought to represent a class of arrestees subjected to strip search
without cause and to secure damages on their behalf under Rule 23(b)(3).137
As proposed by the plaintiff, however, the class presented problems of
adequacy of representation and class definition, since every arrestee (including
Maneely) would require a hearing on the circumstances of his or her arrest
to establish that the search was without cause and demonstrate membership
in the class.138 Rather than simply deny certification of the proposed action,
however, the court exercised its discretion to certify a different class: “I am
not going to certify the class Maneely seeks to represent. Instead, I am
going to certify a broader class, but on a narrower issue . . . .”139 The judge
employed the provision for class actions “with respect to particular issues”140
to certify a class “as to the issue of whether the City of Newburgh maintained a policy of strip searching all pre-arraignment prisoners, with or
without having reasonable suspicion to believe that these persons were
carrying or concealing weapons or contraband,” on behalf of “all persons
who were strip searched before arraignment” within a specified time
period.141 If the class prevailed, she explained, arrestees could then assert
their damages claims in individual suits.142
Judge Shelby Highsmith of the Southern District of Florida also used an
aggressive reformulation in a suit challenging GEICO’s practice of only
reimbursing insured claimants for a portion of their deductible when
GEICO succeeded in securing only a portion of the requested recovery
from the adverse insurer.143 Plaintiff Rosemary Powers sought to recover
damages under Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of a nationwide class, but the court
found that differences in applicable state law created serious predominance
problems and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that those problems
could be overcome.144 Acting on its own, however, the court did find that a
statewide class would pass muster, and it certified that class sua sponte:
136
137
138

Id.
Id. at 70-71.
See id. at 76 (“No person could become a member of the class [the plaintiff ] proposes to
represent . . . until it was determined there was no reasonable suspicion for a search in his
individual case.”).
139 Id.
140 That provision is currently codified at FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). It was Rule 23(c)(4)(A)
in the version of the Rule that Judge McMahon was employing. Maneely, 208 F.R.D. at 78.
141 Maneely, 208 F.R.D. at 78.
142 Id. at 79.
143 See Powers v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 313, 315 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (describing
GEICO’s reimbursement policy).
144 Id. at 318-19.
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“Powers has not proposed any alternative classes. However, this Court finds
that certification of a class comprised of Geico insureds from the State of
Florida satisfies all of the requisite elements for certification.”145 The court
granted the motion for class certification, but on terms substantially different from those proposed by plaintiff.146
Judge John Nixon of the Middle District of Tennessee claimed a similar
authority when adjudicating a request for class certification in Craft v.
Vanderbilt University, a case involving allegations of improper medical
experimentation upon pregnant women. 147 Concluding that the class as
proposed would exhibit serious manageability problems, Judge Nixon
emphasized his “broad discretion in determining whether an action should
be certified as a class action.”148 This discretion encompassed a power “to
modify or reformulate existing classes in the interest of manageability or
other factors bearing upon class appropriateness.”149 He thus decertified the
offending portion of the class and replaced it with an individually administered rebuttable presumption for the affected claimants, a mechanism that
he believed was indicated by the underlying substantive law.150
And in a Title VII action against Wal-Mart alleging racial discrimination
against applicants for truck driving positions, Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,151 Judge Billy Roy Wilson determined that he should not certify a class
that included punitive damage claims for fear that res judicata might
foreclose compensatory damage claims that individual drivers might wish to
pursue, potentially compromising the required commonality of interest
among class members.152 Rather than refuse certification altogether, Judge
Wilson acted on his own to sever punitive damages from the class proposal
and certify “a class only on the issues of classwide liability and declaratory
and equitable relief.”153

145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 320.
Id.
174 F.R.D. 396, 400-01 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 403-04.
245 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Ark. 2007).
Id. at 372-73 (citing Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of
Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1078 (2002)) (noting that claims for punitive
damages, but not compensatory damages, would likely be barred in subsequent litigation). For a
treatment of this species of res judicata concern, see generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion
in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005).
153 Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 373 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (current version at FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(4))).
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Several themes emerge from the body of practice exemplified by these
cases involving judicial reformulation of the class definition. First, the
discretionary power that federal courts possess to reshape the boundaries
and composition of the class is continuous with their power to decide
whether to certify at all. Some courts explicitly draw that connection in
describing their authority over class definition,154 and it is a connection
necessitated by the practical impact of this form of class management. To
restructure a proposed nationwide class into a statewide proceeding, or to
refocus the class definition onto a different aspect of the plaintiff ’s claim, is
to change the nature of the proceeding qualitatively. When the plaintiff
proposes a class that the court determines cannot be certified, the court has
the option of simply refusing. When, instead, the court elects to redefine
the class in the ways explored above, that action entails a determination that
reformulating the class will better serve the purposes of Rule 23 and the
underlying policies of the substantive law than would denying certification
altogether. In making that determination, the court issues a discretionary
decision as to whether or not a class action should occur.
A second theme is closely related: In cases involving class definition,
federal courts view proposed class actions as embodying a significant
element of public trust. When a plaintiff and her attorney file a lawsuit
seeking to represent a class of people they do not know, it is not their sole
prerogative to set the terms on which they will pursue claims on behalf of
the class. Rather, they embark upon a representation the nature and terms
of which may have to be set by the court.155 In theory, a named plaintiff
could insist upon withdrawing as the class representative when a proceeding
is reshaped in ways that she disapproves, but that kind of protest would be
self-defeating in most cases, and the ethical responsibilities of class counsel
might foreclose such self-regarding caprice.156 It is not the prerogative of
154 See id. at 365, 373 (framing its power in the certification process by explaining that “[t]he
decision whether to certify a class action is left to the sound discretion of the district court” and
then severing a portion of the proposed class rather than denying certification altogether).
155 The Second Circuit made a similar observation in an early decision concerning attorney’s
fees under modern Rule 23. In Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1973), the court explained that a class action does not proceed “through simple operation of
the private enterprise system”; rather, “both the class determination and designation of counsel as
class representative come through judicial determinations, and the attorney so benefited serves in
something of a position of public trust.” Several other courts have pointed to this statement by the
Second Circuit in describing the particular nature of the ethical and professional duties that class
counsel bear in a representative proceeding. See, e.g., Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 756 F.2d 1285,
1294 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985) (“We judges can certainly appreciate that there are times when a public
trust resembles indentured servitude, but we are rarely able to alter that situation.”).
156 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (stating that class counsel has a duty to fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class); M ODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1) (2013)
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representative plaintiffs or class counsel to adopt a “my way or the highway”
attitude toward a class proceeding. Rather, by filing a proposed class action,
plaintiffs and their lawyers initiate a dialogue with the court in which their
proposals and preferences are measured against the express requirements
and limitations of Rule 23 and balanced against the court’s determination
regarding the best type of representative proceeding under the governing law.
Third, federal courts have not been limited to the express provisions of
Rule 23 when exercising their discretion to alter the scope or definition of a
proposed class. Their discretion is not unbounded, of course, and courts
frequently employ the underlying substantive law to guide them in deciding
questions of definition and scope in class certification, as in the Craft and
Nelson decisions above. But the text of the Rule does not purport to enumerate all the factors that a court might consider in making these determinations. Thus, in Yamasaki, the Supreme Court recognized the authority of
a court to consider systemic impact when entertaining a proposed injunctive
proceeding. That species of concern is expressly authorized for damages
actions in the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) but is not specified
in section (b)(2). Even so, the Yamasaki Court acknowledged systemic
impact as an appropriate extra-textual consideration.
D. Discretion Not to Certify
The discretion not to certify a class—to exercise judgment in deciding
whether aggregate treatment is appropriate at all, even if the requirements
of Rule 23 are satisfied—is the most consequential form of control that a
federal court can exercise in a putative class action proceeding. With the
elimination of the conditional certification provision from Rule 23(c)(3)(C)
and the Court’s recent emphasis on the need for a “rigorous analysis” prior
to certification,157 a court has minimal power to authorize class certification
outside the clear boundaries of Rule 23’s text. In contrast, the discretion not
to certify has formed a significant part of the class action jurisprudence of
the federal courts since the enactment of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23. It
has found expression in highly influential rulings by the lower federal courts
and enjoyed a partial imprimatur from the Supreme Court itself. Some
rulings have lodged the discretion not to certify in the superiority requirement for cases filed under Rule 23(b)(3) or in the tradition of discretionary
(limiting ability of counsel to withdraw from representation where doing so would impose a
“material adverse effect on the interests of the client”).
157 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011) (“[C]ertification is
proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23
have been satisfied . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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control over equitable relief in (b)(2) actions. Others have not felt the need
for such textual positioning, instead relying directly upon the discretion
inherent in Rule 23. In many of these cases, courts have based their judgments upon an assessment of the underlying law and the impact that a class
action would have upon substantive policies. But courts have also exercised
the discretion not to certify in response to litigation dynamics not specifically tied to any substantive legal regime.
The first major ruling to explore substantive law reasons for exercising
discretion not to certify, and the most influential opinion of its kind for
some years, was Judge Marvin Frankel’s decision in Ratner v. Chemical Bank
New York Trust Co.158 The defendant in Ratner had failed to include a
required disclosure on an initial credit card statement concerning the annual
percentage rate of interest, and a cardholder brought suit under the TILA
seeking to represent 130,000 others under Rule 23(b)(3) and claiming
statutory damages of at least $100 per person.159 The violation was technical
in nature—the company had disclosed the rate in other communications,
provided the required disclosure on subsequent credit card statements, and
corrected the omission on the initial statement when made aware of it.160
The initial omission was still a violation of the clear terms of the TILA,
however, and entitled the plaintiff to summary judgment on the merits.161
The case also seemed particularly well-suited to class treatment: the omission was identical for all cardholders, there was no requirement to show
individual reliance, and the statutory damages provision eliminated any
need for individual proof of harm. Many other district courts had previously
certified classes in similar TILA disputes.162
Judge Frankel denied the request to certify the class in a brief opinion
that began with the following summary of reasons:
(1) there is no affirmative need or justification for such a proceeding in
the actual circumstances of the case; and
(2) the allowance of thousands of minimum recoveries like plaintiff ’s
would carry to an absurd and stultifying extreme the specific and essentially

158
159
160
161

Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 414, 416.
Judge Frankel addressed the merits at length in a separate reported opinion, Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), granting summary
judgment to the individual plaintiff on the merits.
162 See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent remedy Congress prescribed as the means of private enforcement.163

The “broad and open-ended terms” of the newly revised Rule called for “the
exercise of some considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature” in making
certification determinations, the court continued, and permitting a massive
class-wide remedy for technical violations that had already been corrected
would impose “horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to
any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to defendant,” a result
that would be inconsistent with Congress’s purpose in enacting the TILA.164
Invoking the superiority requirement (albeit as something of an afterthought), Judge Frankel declined the request for certification and instead
entered judgment on Ratner’s individual claim.165
Ratner had a dramatic impact on TILA litigation and subsequent legislative developments. In one illustrative 1973 case, Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of
Kansas City, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of class
certification in a TILA case involving a broader set of alleged failures to
disclose required information in credit card statements, with a total potential liability of over one billion dollars. 166 Relying on Judge Frankel’s
opinion, the court of appeals rejected the proposition that class actions must
be available either always or never for TILA violations. Instead, it authorized a discretionary approach “in view of a congressional confidence in case
by case determinations” about the propriety of class certification “by
qualified and informed trial judges with a wide general discretion and
specific leeway under Rule 23 itself to avoid inferior, unfair or senseless
applications” of the statute.167 A report of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs concerning the amendments to the TILA
enacted in 1974 described Ratner as the “leading case” on TILA class actions
and quantified its impact:
Prior to the Ratner decision on February 14, 1972, the courts affirmed 8
Truth in Lending suits as class actions while denying class action status to 3.
Since the Ratner case, the courts denied 21 Truth in Lending suits class
action status while affirming only one and in that case, only after the plaintiffs amended their complaint to sue only for actual damages.168
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164
165
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Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 414.
Id. at 416.
Id.
474 F.2d 336, 340, 349 (10th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 344.
S. REP. NO. 93-278, at 14 (1973) (Conf. Rep.) (italics added).
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The amendments responded to Ratner’s use of trial court discretion to avoid
industry-destroying liability by imposing a statutory cap of $100,000 on
total classwide damages in order to remove the crushing potential of
classwide liability and preserve the feasibility of class remedies for private
enforcement.169 Further amendments in 1976 raised the damages cap to
$500,000 to ensure that private enforcement would remain a financially
viable mechanism for plaintiffs’ lawyers.170 The discretion not to certify that
Judge Frankel and others exercised in the early TILA cases did not provoke
a congressional rebuke; rather, it initiated a dialogue with Congress that
preserved the private remedy under the statute while reducing the need for
courts to apply a safety valve.171
The TILA cases were the first major occasion where the lower federal
courts systematically exercised discretion not to certify under modern Rule
23, but they are not singular. Courts have exercised that prerogative in a
range of substantive contexts since the 1966 revisions. In some cases, courts
have grounded the decision to deny certification on an assessment of the
impact that class treatment would have upon the specific policies reflected
in the law underlying the dispute, as in Ratner and its progeny. In others,
like the widely cited opinion of Judge Posner in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Inc.,172 courts have identified the potential impact of class certification on
shared social policies as a basis for exercising discretion in deciding when
class certification is advisable without tying their analysis to any particular
substantive legal regime. And in still others, courts have invoked institutional principles not directly linked to substantive policy, particularly in
cases involving government defendants in which the class device is invoked
169 See id. at 14-15 (noting that the purpose of TILA’s civil penalties section “was to provide
creditors with a meaningful incentive to comply with the law” but that this purpose could “be
achieved without subjecting creditors to enormous penalties”).
170 The report of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs regarding the 1976
amendments described the purpose of the increased statutory cap in the following terms:

The Committee wishes to avoid any implication that the ceiling on class action recovery
is meant to discourage use of the class action device. The recommended $500,000 limit,
coupled with the 1% formula, provides, we believe, a workable structure for private
enforcement. Small businesses are protected by the 1% measure, while a potential half
million dollar recovery ought to act as a significant deterrent to even the largest creditor.
S. REP. NO. 94-590, at 8 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
171 Although the need to apply a safety valve was reduced, it was not eliminated: some district courts continued to exercise discretion not to certify in TILA cases following the 1974 and
1976 amendments in cases where they believed that the purposes of the remedy would be
subverted by class treatment. These decisions sometimes received deferential treatment from the
courts of appeals. See, e.g., Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 1980)
(holding class certification may be denied even in cases involving only technical violations).
172 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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primarily as a tool for ensuring broad compliance. The range is broad and
the record deep.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never issued a major holding
on the discretion not to certify, but the Court has assumed and relied upon
the existence of such discretion. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Supreme
Court confronted an antitrust question regarding the availability of treble
damages in consumer lawsuits. 173 The case involved allegations of price
fixing in the market for hearing aids that increased the cost of the product,
and the plaintiff, a consumer, sought treble damages on behalf of all retail
purchasers of the affected devices.174 The appellate court held that treble
damages were unavailable because an individual consumer was not injured
in her “business or property” by anticompetitive behavior (a requirement
under the statute),175 but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that “the
word ‘property’ has a naturally broad and inclusive meaning” that necessarily
includes a consumer’s loss of money when paying inflated prices for
goods.176 The defendants protested that making treble damages available in
consumer class actions would “have a potentially ruinous effect on small
businesses in particular and will ultimately be paid by consumers in any
event,” urging the Court to find the remedy wholly unavailable in that
category of cases. 177 The Court acknowledged the importance of these
concerns but found that the “plain language” of the Clayton Act precluded a
holding that consumers were ineligible for treble damages.178 Nevertheless,
as in Yamasaki—which was heard in the same Term and handed down nine
days after Reiter—the Court went on to opine on the important systemic
role of federal court discretion in potentially troublesome categories of class
proceeding:
District courts must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought
to extort nuisance settlements; they have broad power and discretion vested
in them by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 with respect to matters involving the
certification and management of potentially cumbersome or frivolous class
actions. Recognition of the plain meaning of the statutory language “business
or property” need not result in administrative chaos, class-action harassment,
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442 U.S. 330, 335 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 338-39, 345.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 345.
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or “windfall” settlements if the district courts exercise sound discretion and
use the tools available.179

Treble damages in consumer claims need not produce extortion, the Reiter
Court concluded, because frivolous claimants could be prevented from
obtaining windfall class settlements through the “broad power and discretion” that the district court possesses to decide whether and under what
conditions to certify a class.180 Judge Friendly drew upon this passage in
Abrams when describing the nature of federal court discretion in a consumer
class action alleging price fixing,181 and lower courts have drawn upon Reiter
when exploring the meaning and application of this discretionary mechanism
of control in a variety of cases, many (though not all) involving antitrust
disputes.182
179 Id. (citations omitted). Reiter postdates by five years the Court’s ruling in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The Reiter Court apparently deemed it obvious that a district
court had discretion to determine whether certification was appropriate where the plaintiff ’s
claims appeared “frivolous,” id. at 345, a proposition at odds with the received account of Eisen as a
case prohibiting district courts from basing certification decisions on an initial assessment of the
merits. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2008) (highlighting and rejecting this received account of Eisen). Eisen’s actual holding was that the district
court abused its discretion when it imposed the costs of notice upon the defendant based upon a
positive assessment of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, a procedure that “allow[s] a representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the requirements for it.”
417 U.S. at 177. The Eisen Court introduced that holding with the broadly worded sentence, now
notorious, that “nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 [] gives a court any authority
to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action.” Id. The Court has since clarified the limited significance of that
language. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011) (noting that rigorous
analysis of certification may entail some overlap with the merits).
180 Reiter, 442 U.S. at 345.
181 See Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Court [in Reiter] emphasized the broad power and discretion vested in the courts by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 . . . .”).
182 See, e.g., In re Datapoint Corp., 1996 WL 673320, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 1996) (relying
upon Reiter to grant a district court broad leeway to decline to certify until and unless it has a high
level of confidence that certification of a novel defendant class would be appropriate); Greenhaw v.
Lubbock Cnty. Beverage Ass’n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983) (recognizing Reiter’s invitation
to deny certification in cases involving “frivolous and unmeritorious” claims but affirming the
district court in rejecting the argument that denial of certification is warranted solely because class
counsel will receive greater compensation than any individual class member), overruled on other
grounds by Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174, 1181 n.8 (5th Cir.
1986); Marks v. S.F. Real Estate Bd., 627 F.2d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 1980) (opinion of Larson, J.)
(citing the language regarding discretion in Reiter as a negative example to the case before him, a
consumer antitrust case where defendants argued that the extent of their liability exposure
counseled against certification of a class).
Justice Breyer also draws upon Reiter in his separate opinions in both Amchem and Ortiz,
although he cites the case out of context, offering Reiter as support for an expansive account of a
district court’s discretion to certify in cases requiring experimentation, rather than as a basis for
denying certification in cases calling for a safety valve. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
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The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) often serves as the doctrinal
home for policy-driven determinations that certification is unwarranted.
Indeed, in one price-fixing ruling that predated Reiter by several years,
Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district
court’s denial of class certification on superiority grounds, with a brief
discussion that identified superiority determinations as lying “in an area
where the trial court’s discretion is paramount.”183 But courts have exercised
this authority in non-(b)(3) actions as well. Consider King v. Kansas City
Southern Industries, Inc., a decision by the Seventh Circuit in a securities
action alleging violations of federal and state law in the merger of two
investment advising entities.184 One plaintiff sought to certify a class of
shareholders under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), arguing that individual actions
threatened to generate inconsistent adjudications. 185 The district court
refused the certification request, in part due to concerns over the feasibility
of notice to the class and manageability of the action, and in part based on
its conclusion that an alternative method of relief was available that would
better serve the policies underlying the securities laws. 186 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, holding that determinations regarding what “procedure
would further the policies underlying [the substantive law]” were an
appropriate basis for denying certification and that “[d]etermination of the
manageability” of a proposed action is “a matter for the trial court’s discretion” in “all class actions,” not just actions brought under subsection
(b)(3).187 The district court’s decision to refuse a class action in deference to
a direct action by the injured funds “was a practical decision within its
discretion,” the appellate court found, and its finding that “a class action
would not best further the underlying policies” in the dispute fell within the
proper bounds of its discretion. 188 Throughout the opinion, the Seventh
Circuit based its account of the district court’s discretion on general principles

868 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (invoking Reiter for the proposition that “district court[s should
be allowed] full authority to exercise every bit of discretionary power that the law provides”);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (suggesting that district courts have broad power to certify class actions under
Reiter because they are more familiar than the appellate courts with the issues).
183 511 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1975).
184 519 F.2d 20, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1975).
185 Id. at 25.
186 See id. (discussing alternative of a direct action by the funds allegedly injured by the merger,
possibly including intervention by individual shareholders).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 26-27.
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of certification under Rule 23, rather than the particularities of any subsection of Rule 23(b).189
And then there is Judge Posner’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit in In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., a nationwide class action brought against manufacturers of blood solid products for failing to guard adequately against the
transmission of HIV to hemophiliacs.190 After a period characterized by
increasingly expansive applications of Rule 23 in personal injury and
products liability cases, Rhone-Poulenc was the first of three cases—along
with In re American Medical Systems, Inc.191 from the Sixth Circuit and
Castano v. American Tobacco Co.192 from the Fifth Circuit—that marked a
significant shift, employing extraordinary forms of review to reject broad
classes that had been certified by district courts193 and spurring the Civil
Rules Committee to amend Rule 23 in 1998 by adding a provision for
immediate appeal of class certification rulings when deemed appropriate by
the circuit courts.194
The primary basis that Judge Posner offered for rejecting the district
court’s certification order through the extraordinary device of mandamus
intervention related to the immature nature of the tort claim at issue.
Certification of a nationwide class would have forced the defendants to
“stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial” in a claim that
had not yet been tested through “a decentralized process of multiple trials,
involving different juries, and different standards of liability”—a way of
proceeding that threatened to impose overwhelming pressure to settle even
when the defendant is confident on the merits.195 The majority acknowledged
189 The en banc Third Circuit conducted a similar analysis in one of the early TILA cases. In
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., the court reversed a district court’s certification of a TILA case and
recounted the potential for serious adverse consequences to the defendant if notice was issued to
the class regarding a claim of “doubtful validity.” 496 F.2d 747, 757-58 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). In
examining the alternative remedies available to claimants, the court described the role that stare
decisis and non-mutual offensive issue preclusion might play in empowering cardholders to
establish liability and found that “it is hardly fair to say that the judicial system must insist on res
judicata [through class certification] rather than collateral estoppel or stare decisis.” Id. at 760.
190 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1995).
191 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
192 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
193 AMS and Rhone-Poulenc employed mandamus to conduct their review. See AMS, 75 F.3d
at 1074; Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294. Castano came up by way of a certified interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See 84 F.3d at 737.
194 See FED. R. CIV . P. 23(f ) (permitting immediate appeal from the grant or denial of class
certification if accepted by the court of appeals); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f ) advisory committee’s note
to the 1998 amendments (describing the change).
195 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 710 & n.57 (2013) (discussing the “blackmail effect” described by Judge
Posner and noting disagreement about the magnitude of the problem in modern class litigation).
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“the district judge’s commendable desire to experiment with an innovative
procedure for streamlining the adjudication of th[e] mass tort,”196 but it
found that the use of a centralized nationwide class action in an immature
tort case where claims were capable of being litigated on an individual basis,
coupled with problems in the definition of the liability standard and the
disaggregation of common and individual issues, rendered the certification
order an abuse of discretion even on the extraordinarily deferential standards of mandamus review.197
Judge Posner wrote in Rhone-Poulenc as though his analysis was largely
sui generis, but his opinion is of a piece with the antitrust and securities
rulings described above: an exercise of judicial discretion declining to certify
a broad class action on the basis of a conclusion that aggregate litigation
would undermine important substantive policy values. Rhone-Poulenc is not
as careful as some of those earlier precedents in identifying the specific
source of the substantive policies that counsel against class treatment. Judge
Posner invokes general concerns regarding premature comprehensive
adjudication of novel liability questions without ascribing those concerns to
any particular body of state law,198 and the extraordinary posture of mandamus review raises important questions about the propriety of the majority’s
action. But in other respects, Rhone-Poulenc is quite similar to earlier rulings
that denied class certification to avoid undermining substantive law. As in
Kansas City Southern Industries, the majority in Rhone-Poulenc operated
outside the scope of the superiority requirement when it ruled that individual actions would better serve the tort policies implicated in the case than
would a broad class proceeding, a mode of analysis that traces back to Ratner
and the TILA cases.199 And in acknowledging the proper role of experimentation in the aggregate treatment of novel claims along with the necessary
limits upon such experimentation, the court joined a conversation that
began in the earliest post-1966 class action rulings and that eventually
produced such reforms as the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 that eliminated

196
197
198

Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1297 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1304.
See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 67-68 (2010) (describing Judge Posner’s assertions about “the
danger of adjudicating an immature tort in a nationwide class action” as “incomplete”).
199 The district judge in Rhone-Poulenc had proceeded exclusively on the authority of Rule
23(c)(4) to certify a class “with respect to particular issues” and the Seventh Circuit never cites or
discusses the superiority provision in its analysis. 51 F.3d at 1297. Judge Rovner, in dissent,
criticized the majority for this feature of its analysis, calling instead for a strict account of judicial
discretion in the certification decision limited to factors expressly authorized by the Rule. Id. at
1307-08 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
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conditional certification.200 Judge Posner’s opinion has played a larger role
than some of those earlier precedents in shaping later discussions about
substantive law and the discretion not to certify, but it did not originate
those discussions.
The discretion not to certify also finds expression in cases where the
district court’s reasons for skepticism over the propriety of a class proceeding relate to broader litigation dynamics rather than specific substantive
policies. The Fourth Circuit has offered one of the strongest statements of
the discretion not to certify in this mode. In Lowery v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., the appellate court affirmed the decision of a district court to decertify
a Title VII pattern and practice claim that alleged racial discrimination
against African-American workers at the Virginia headquarters of a major
retailer.201 After initially finding that the requirements of Rule 23 were
satisfied and certifying the class, the trial court concluded that class treatment of the particular claims before it would be inefficient, unmanageable,
and cumbersome.202 It also developed concerns that the plaintiffs’ proposal
to try the question of punitive damages on a classwide basis before conducting
individual hearings on actual harm, compensatory damages, and employeespecific defenses could result in an overestimation of the egregiousness of
defendant’s conduct and hence an excessive damages award.203 Efficiency
and a fair estimation of damages are not enumerated as specific considerations in Rule 23(b)(2), under which the plaintiffs were proceeding,204 but the
Fourth Circuit insisted upon the prerogative of district courts to factor such
concerns into the certification decision nonetheless:
Rule 23 states that an action “may” be maintained as a class action if the listed
requirements are met. The Rule does not say that, once the requirements are
met, the district court “must” certify and maintain the suit as a class action. . . . [W]e have previously held that district courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class. This broad discretion necessarily
200
201

See supra Section II.A.
158 F.3d 742, 753-54, 768 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999), aff ’d in pertinent
part, 206 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2000).
202 Id. at 753-54.
203 Id. at 758-59.
204 The Fourth Circuit noted that such concerns might fairly be comprised within the (b)(3)
factors relating to superiority and, while disclaiming any intent to import those factors wholesale
into subsection (b)(2), held “that in appropriate circumstances a district court may exercise its
discretion to deny certification if the resulting class action would be unmanageable or cumbersome.” Id. at 758 n.5.
The use of Rule 23(b)(2) in an action seeking broad punitive and compensatory damages does
not survive the Court’s decision in Dukes. See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (holding that claims for
individualized monetary relief are not appropriate for certification under subsection (b)(2)).
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implies that the district court may appropriately consider factors other than
those listed in Rule 23 in determining whether to certify a class action. . . . [T]he district court has such broad discretion to certify a class
because it is intimately familiar with such practical and factual intricacies of
the suit.205

I have not discovered a judicial interpretation of the permissive language of
Rule 23 that more directly calls into question the Court’s apparent treatment of the issue in Shady Grove than this one. The substance of the Lowery
court’s interpretation, however, represents the dominant sentiment among
the lower federal courts throughout the post-1966 period. Similarly, lower
federal courts have regularly claimed discretion to deny certification in cases
involving uncertainty over the enumerated requirements of Rule 23 when
their analysis produces indeterminate results and requires the exercise of
judgment about the workability of a class proceeding. Thus, cases where the
parameters of a class definition are “inherently nonspecific” and leave doubt
about the ascertainability of class membership have led courts to claim
broad discretion in denying class certification—one among many possible
examples.206
Litigation against government officials has also produced a line of cases
that assert a distinct justification for judicial discretion to deny class certification despite a complaint’s seeming compliance with the provisions of Rule
23. In cases involving requests for injunctive relief against government
defendants, the proposition that a class action might be an unnecessary form
of relief has been formally adopted by a number of federal circuits as a basis
for denying class treatment, often under the rubric of a “necessity requirement.” The doctrine has its origin in another influential ruling by Judge
Friendly in Galvan v. Levine, a case involving a New York policy that
targeted workers of Puerto Rican origin for the denial of unemployment
benefits.207 A three-judge panel tried the claims of two individual Puerto
Rican plaintiffs, found the challenged policy unconstitutional, and enjoined
its further enforcement, a result that the state accepted.208 The panel denied
the plaintiffs’ request to certify a class on behalf of all similarly affected
205
206

Lowery, 158 F.3d at 757-58 (citations omitted).
See Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (denying certification of
a class purporting to represent employees “who presently reside or desire to reside outside of
Milwaukee County” in challenging a residency requirement for civil service employment); see also
7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL P RACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed.
2005 & Supp. 2013) (collecting cases regarding determinations whether class actions should be
certified).
207 490 F.2d 1255, 1257 (2d Cir. 1973).
208 Id. at 1260.
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workers, however, and the plaintiffs appealed from that denial. 209 The
Second Circuit affirmed and suggested that class certification was generally
unnecessary in cases involving facial constitutional challenges to government policies:
[I]nsofar as the relief sought is prohibitory, an action seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief against state officials on the ground of unconstitutionality
of a statute or administrative practice is the archetype of one where class
action designation is largely a formality, at least for the plaintiffs. . . . [W]hat is important in such a case for the plaintiffs or, more
accurately, for their counsel, is that the judgment run to the benefit not only
of the named plaintiffs but of all others similarly situated, as the judgment
did here. The State has made clear that it understands the judgment to bind
it with respect to all claimants; indeed even before entry of the judgment, it
withdrew the challenged policy even more fully than the court ultimately
directed and stated it did not intend to reinstate the policy.210

A number of other circuits have adopted some version of this necessity
requirement, but most have emphasized that the doctrine is discretionary—
not automatic—and must be administered with careful attention to the
enforcement dynamics of particular disputes.211 There have been occasions
when lower federal courts have denied class treatment in such cases and
government officials have then failed to come into general compliance after
losing on the merits, justifying the certification of a broad remedial class in
subsequent proceedings.212
209
210
211

Id.
Id. at 1261 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985) (recognizing the discretion of
federal courts to “deny Rule 23(b)(2) certification where it is a formality or otherwise inappropriate” but emphasizing the need for attention to “situations where a class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) will arguably be unnecessary, but where other considerations may render a denial of
certification improper”); Duprey v. Conn. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 191 F.R.D. 329, 339 (D. Conn.
2000) (explaining that “whether to apply the necessity doctrine is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the district court” and finding that a defendant’s refusal to concede the
commonality and typicality of the class claims indicates a likelihood that the defendant will resist
voluntary compliance militating in favor of class certification if otherwise appropriate).
212 For example, in Bermudez v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, plaintiffs challenged the federal
food stamp program’s refusal to provide retroactive adjustments to welfare recipients whose
benefits were found to have been wrongfully withheld. 490 F.2d 718, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Earlier suits challenging the same policy had been initiated in other courts, which had denied
nationwide class treatment on the strength of the assumptions that “the federal government would
voluntarily rescind the policy” and that “the precedential value of the judgment would make a
class action unnecessary.” Id. at 724. “Neither of these hopes [was] fulfilled,” so the district court in
Bermudez determined that class relief had become necessary, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id.
at 724-25.
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As with many of the cases involving the discretion not to certify, courts
vary in the textual justifications they offer, if any, for this necessity doctrine.
Thus, the First Circuit has explained that it “prefer[s] not to speak of a
‘necessity requirement.’” 213 Instead, it has adopted a reading of Rule
23(b)(2)’s language requiring injunctive relief that is “appropriate respecting
the class as a whole”214 to mean that a classwide injunction is not “appropriate” when it appears unnecessary to achieve broad remedial compliance.215
In contrast, Judge Leon of the D.C. District Court recently disclaimed any
need for specific textual justification in exercising the discretion not to
certify in a suit against a government defendant, explaining that “[e]ven
though the proposed classes satisfy the eligibility criteria in Rule 23, the
Court may nevertheless deny class certification based on other relevant
considerations” and may “tak[e] account of factors not expressly delineated
in Rule 23.”216 The judge found this species of discretion to be particularly
well-suited for facial constitutional challenges to government policies in
which the court believes that a single decree will provide relief to all
affected individuals.217
Finally, some decisions have recognized discretion not to certify in damages
actions where the remedial justification for a class action is unclear. One
early influential case of this type, Kamm v. California City Development Co.,
involved a dispute in which investors claimed fraud by promoters of a real
estate development scheme.218 By the time the plaintiffs requested class
certification, California public authorities had already initiated an enforcement proceeding against the developers in which they secured an injunction
that prohibited further deceptive practices and negotiated a settlement
requiring the defendants to offer restitution to injured parties.219 Investors
who chose to reject those offers of restitution could still pursue their claims,
and the class representatives sought to advance these claims on an aggregate
basis.220 The district court invoked the superiority requirement to deny the
request for certification, finding that the alternative remedy available under
the state settlement rendered it unnecessary to permit parties who rejected

213
214
215
216
217

Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (emphasis added).
Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356.
Mills v. Dist. of Columbia, 266 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2010).
See id. at 22-23 (“[T]he relief sought by the named plaintiffs by virtue of their facial challenge affords sufficient protection to the proposed class members . . . thereby making class
certification in this particular context wholly unnecessary.”).
218 509 F.2d 205, 207 (9th Cir. 1975).
219 Id. at 207-08.
220 Id. at 208.
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the offer of restitution to pursue private remedies on an aggregate basis.221
The Ninth Circuit found this ruling to be an appropriate exercise of
discretion, emphasizing the “[s]ignificant relief ” already realized by the
investors and the likelihood that a class action would “duplicate and possibly
to some extent negate” the work already undertaken in the state proceedings.222 Kamm continues to be cited in discussions about the propriety of
class certification of damages claims in the aftermath of regulatory enforcement proceedings.223
III. ANALYZING THE ROLE OF DISCRETION
IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
My primary purpose in this Article is a descriptive one. The topic of
discretion in class certification has received inadequate attention in the
scholarly and judicial literature with no systematic account of the types of
discretion that courts have actually exercised since the 1966 revisions to
Rule 23. The overview and taxonomy that I set forth above is far from
complete, but I believe that it provides a framework within which more
useful analysis can develop.
My normative goals are more limited. The cases discussed above encompass a broad range of liability policies and litigation contexts, and it would
require a dedicated and sustained treatment to advance any well-supported
argument about the proper role of a court’s discretion in any one of them.
That said, I am convinced that the judicial devices described throughout
this Article must be available as potential tools in any successful system of
class litigation. In this Part, I offer some further observations about the
systemic nature of discretion in class certification: its inevitability in the
administration of aggregate proceedings, and some of the elements of class
action doctrine that can serve as counterweights to the exercise of discretion
by lower federal courts. I also address the impact of Shady Grove on this
system of discretion—an impact that is considerably more modest than the
Court’s arresting language in that opinion might first lead one to assume.
221
222
223

Id. at 209.
Id. at 212.
See, e.g., In re Conseco Life Ins. Co. LifeTrend Ins. Sales & Mktg. Litig., 270 F.R.D. 521,
533 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (distinguishing Kamm in an injunctive class action presenting liability
theories distinct from those pursued by regulators); Thornton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
2006 WL 3359482, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2006) (citing Kamm in support of “the proposition
that state relief coupled with an opportunity to bring individual claims is superior to a class
action”); see also Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming
a district court’s denial of class certification in a Title VII action where an earlier consent decree
offered a no-fault method of relief ) .
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A. The System of Discretion Surrounding Class Certification
The forms of discretion explored in the previous Parts reveal several
unsurprising truths regarding class action litigation. First, there is a significant amount of indeterminacy in the certification of class proceedings, and
there are limitations on the ability of strictly defined rules to resolve this
indeterminacy.224 Experimentation is inevitable when courts encounter a
request for class certification in a new type of claim involving new types of
proof.225 The discretion to limit the definition of a class to a core set of
claims that are particularly well-suited to aggregate treatment, or to constrain the geographic scope of the class so as to limit the impact of certification in uncertain terrain, permits courts to develop a body of knowledge and
practice over time from which they can make more confident decisions
about certification.226 As the Tenth Circuit observed in Wilcox v. Commerce
Bank of Kansas City, “it might be comforting to all of us in a way if each
decision on review could clatter out of a slot brightly and clearly minted
whenever governing symbols seemed to match, without the necessity of
pondering over more imponderable but significant indications.”227 But that
is not how complex cases usually operate.
Second, the introduction of class certification into a liability scheme can
produce unforeseen consequences, and the general presumption that
224 Professor Kim makes a similar observation in her analysis of discretion among lower
courts, admonishing quantitative analysts to engage with legal doctrine when seeking to measure
judicial behavior. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 388 (2007)
(“Despite the demand of hierarchical precedent, lower federal courts retain a substantial amount
of discretion when deciding cases. . . . To some extent that discretion exists because it is
unavoidable—legal language is at some point irredeemably indeterminate.”); see also H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961) (arguing that legal rules “will, at some point where
their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open
texture”).
225 The Fifth Circuit made this point in Castano when explaining its reason for rejecting a
single nationwide class action for claims that the tobacco industry induced its customers to become
dependent upon nicotine. See 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The primary procedural difficulty
created by immature torts is the inherent difficulty a district court will have in determining
whether the requirements of [R]ule 23 have been met.”).
Castano’s analysis of these issues can fairly be characterized as hostile toward the claimants.
Indeed, “jeremiad” would be an apt term to describe the tenor of its analysis. The court seemed
more interested in foreclosing a nationwide proceeding than in providing guidance for how smaller
and more discretely defined class proceedings might fall within the proper bounds of a district
court’s discretion, creating opportunities for experimentation with aggregate treatment of these
novel claims.
226 See Friendly, supra note 13, at 771-73 (describing the value of allowing appellate courts to
develop settled practice over time, and arguing for concomitantly greater appellate constraints on
district court discretion in such cases).
227 474 F.2d 336, 348 (10th Cir. 1973).
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legislatures enact statutes against the backdrop of an existing procedural
landscape is frequently an inadequate response. Indeed, in light of the
robust tradition of discretion in class certification reflected in the cases
discussed herein, such discretion may fairly be characterized as an established part of that procedural landscape. In cases where the statutory
language allows it, the discretion not to certify can operate as a safety valve,
permitting courts to explore the available avenues for relief in a series of
cases from which they can determine when class treatment is appropriate
and, conversely, when broad certification orders threaten to undermine the
values sought to be promoted by the legislative scheme. As Professor
Burbank and I have argued:
The history of Rule 23 . . . entails a seventy-year-long discussion of the
deeply intertwined relationship between the procedural mechanism that
enables aggregation of large numbers of claims for adjudication and the
capacity of that mechanism to ossify certain liability rules (in the case of
original Rule 23) or to catalyze innovation in the liability policies of the
underlying law (in the case of the post-1966 version of the Rule, and particularly Rule 23(b)(3)).228

Almost fifty years of experience under modern Rule 23 has produced a nowunavoidable “awareness that in ‘procedure’ lurks power to alter or mask
substantive results.”229 Discretion in class certification must be sufficiently
capacious to address those substantive impacts in appropriate cases. Again
the Tenth Circuit in Wilcox: “[O]ur whole system of justice is importantly
geared to the balancing of judgment across variant and numerous circumstances by judges who must be entrusted[,] from the very difficulties of
remote comparison and the superior perception of firsthand impression[,] to
a wide discretion.”230
Third, the forms of discretion explored in the Sections above are interconnected. As Section II.C discusses, the power to control the definition or
scope of a proposed class—a widely acknowledged and uncontroversial form
of judicial control—is not qualitatively distinct from the discretion not to
certify. Judge Friendly argued that the forms of procedural discretion that
are most directly tied to matters of substantive policy may require the most
invasive forms of appellate control, at least once the federal courts have
228 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 198, at 62; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
344-45 (1979) (identifying the protection of consumers as a primary purpose of the antitrust laws
and a guiding principle in the certification of consumer class actions).
229 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 198, at 30.
230 474 F.2d at 348.
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acquired sufficient experience to have confidence in setting forth constraining
rules.231 But it is not possible to eliminate the more consequential forms of
discretion in class certification altogether without threatening the pliability,
and hence the viability, of the entire enterprise.
There are dangers associated with robust judicial discretion. The type of
trial court discretion that the Tenth Circuit approved in Shook v. Board of
County Commissioners of El Paso232 threatens a lack of uniformity in the
treatment of requests for certification and an appearance of inconsistency in
the rule of law. Discretion in matters with such immediate substantive
implications can also turn into a platform for the advancement of policy
preferences or the expression of judicial hostility toward particular substantive legal regimes. While the legal realist mindset would assume that the
advancement of judicial preferences is unavoidable, discretion in class
certification may present more acute dangers on that score.233 And insofar as
the exercise of discretion aims to develop better information about the
consequences of class certification in the face of indeterminacy, there is
reason to question whether courts tend to overestimate their own expertise
and, relatedly, whether the costs of indeterminacy should be addressed by
politically accountable actors instead. Professor Bone has developed a
general critique of procedural discretion along these lines, and while I

231 See Friendly, supra note 18, at 758 (arguing that “broad appellate constraint is necessary”
in cases with substantive policy implications “to preserve the most basic principle of jurisprudence” that “we must act alike in all cases of like nature”).
232 543 F.3d 597, 603-04 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming a district court’s denial of certification in
an institutional reform case for reasons bearing upon remedial policy and predominance, while
also acknowledging that “other district courts perhaps could have chosen, or could choose, to
certify similar classes”).
233 See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 764 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (Seitz,
C.J., dissenting) (“The unarticulated major premise of the majority decision is a distaste for class
actions, at least in the present context [of a TILA dispute]. I do not believe such distaste, however
widely shared, justifies judicial emasculation of Rule 23.”); Marcus, supra note 103, at 1606 (“The
increasing vigor of the federal courts in tailoring the class action and other procedures to handle
mass tort litigation has done little to disguise the substantive objective.” (footnote omitted)).
Professor Coffee has argued that trial judges are particularly prone to act from institutional
self-interest, limiting the rights of parties in service of case management and docket clearing. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343, 1463 (1995) (“[T]he fact of judicial self-interest must be placed at center stage. . . . [T]he
least acceptable reform proposals are those that simply increase the discretion of the trial judge.
Given such discretion, the right to opt out would soon wither, and litigant autonomy might
increasingly become a nostalgic memory.” (footnote omitted)).
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disagree with his conclusions, the concerns that he identifies require serious
attention.234
The alternative, however, is to adopt strictly defined rules that avoid
unsustainable outcomes in some problematic cases at the cost of foreclosing
socially useful class actions in others. In Amchem, for example, the Court
rejected a massive coordinated effort to employ a settlement-only class
action to address the catastrophe of asbestos personal injury litigation.235
The majority decision was characterized by strict formalism, demanding
adherence to prophylactic rules without any allowance for a pragmatic
assessment of the value of those rules in the actual case. That approach is
appropriate when reviewing adequacy of representation—a structural
protection that calls for prophylactic rules designed to guard against
conflicts of interest. But it was counterproductive when applied to
predominance—a requirement grounded in pragmatism where the need for
prophylactic protection is not apparent and the case for a more contextsensitive exercise of discretion is compelling.236 Similarly, in the early years
234 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1961, 2002 (2007) (arguing that trial courts lack the competency to tailor procedures to
individual cases in a consistently effective manner).
235 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) (recognizing that
although “a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most secure,
fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure,” the case before the Court
could not be sustained as a class action).
236 See Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1106-07 (2013) (criticizing Amchem for “equating predominance
with class cohesion and then tying class cohesion to the legitimacy of adjudicative representation”
and thereby “enlist[ing] predominance to do due process and fairness work as well”); Robert H.
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 802-07 (2013) (discussing the
impact of Amchem’s rigid approach to predominance on class settlement practices, which makes
“courts feel constrained to reject a class settlement because of predominance issues that were
irrelevant in the settlement context”).
The Court’s primary justification for a strict enforcement of predominance in the settlement
context was a concern that class counsel would lack leverage in negotiations and that the court
would have inadequate information in assessing the fairness of a proposed settlement:

[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and
(b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation, both class
counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to settlement negotiations
could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer, and the court would face a
bargain proffered for its approval without benefit of adversarial investigation.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (citations omitted).
I do not dismiss this concern out of hand, but it was clearly misapplied in the asbestos cases,
where plaintiff’s counsel enjoyed significant leverage through the threat to continue litigating
individual asbestos claims on an inventory basis, as indeed they did after the settlement was
invalidated. See Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1912-15 (2002) (describing the dynamics of aggregated inventory litigation
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of the TILA, when lower federal courts were presented with class actions
that would have imposed crippling liability, sometimes based on minor and
technical disclosure infractions,237 the discretion to assess the propriety of
class certification in light of the purposes of the TILA alleviated the intense
pressure to restrict Rule 23 in more categorical terms in order to avoid
unsustainable results. The Wilcox court captures this proposition, as well: “It
would be worse in the long run to maim or kill . . . Rule [23] with universal but improvident kindness than to limit on a case by case basis within
sound judicial discretion its application to situations offering sensible
results.”238
There are mediating factors in class action doctrine that address some of
the concerns raised by the discretion to redefine a class or deny certification.
One systemic counterweight to the impact of the discretion not to certify is
the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp.239 Bayer rejected an
attempt by the defendant in a products liability case to use a federal court
judgment that had denied certification of a proposed statewide class in West
Virginia as grounds to enjoin a state court from certifying a class of the
same claimants asserting the same claims.240 The Court found that differences in West Virginia’s certification standard meant that the issue resolved
in the federal judgment was not the same as that presented in the state
court, rendering the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act
unavailable,241 and also that the putative class members of the uncertified
class were never made “parties” to the federal court action and hence were
not bound by the judgment in any event.242 The Court did not reach the
question of whether due process would make injunctive enforcement of a
denial of certification impossible, resting only on the federal common law of
for asbestos claims). However, unlike the Court in Amchem, I view the impact that an inability to
certify a litigation class would have upon class settlement negotiations as a matter properly subject
to judicial discretion rather than a strict prophylactic rule.
237 The extent to which litigation under the early TILA involved only “technical” violations
is disputed. See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 889-90 (2003) (noting that
“more than half of TILA litigation in [the pre-1989 era] challenged the accuracy of finance charges
‘not a “technicality,” but one of the two most fundamental disclosures mandated by TIL[A]’”
(quoting KATHLEEN E. KEEST & GARY KLEIN, TRUTH IN LENDING 36 (3d ed. 1995))).
238 474 F.2d 336, 349 (10th Cir. 1973); see also Marcus, supra note 103, at 1611 (highlighting
problems with alternatives to the use of procedural discretion and noting that critics of discretion
“seem to concede that the systemic changes that have led to the current situation do not admit of
ready cures”).
239 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
240 Id. at 2382.
241 Id. at 2377-79.
242 Id. at 2379-82.
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preclusion and reserving decision on the power of Congress or the drafters
of the Federal Rules to expand the scope of that common law doctrine.243
Bayer erects a barrier that limits the impact of a federal court’s denial of
certification, preserving the ability of putative class members to initiate a
new action and to convince another court that certification is in fact warranted. To the extent that the doctrine of discretion suggests room for
different judgments among lower federal courts in the propriety of class
certification, Bayer creates space for the exploration of the issue among
different jurists. The “principles of comity” counseling adherence to prior
rulings that the Supreme Court anticipated among lower federal courts in
Bayer244 should operate at their strongest when the initial court determines
that a proposed action fails to satisfy strict rule-based requirements for
certification, rendering class treatment wholly inappropriate. Where the
denial of certification involves the type of judgment that could lead “other
district courts . . . [to] choose[] to certify similar classes,” as the Tenth
Circuit explained the issue in Shook,245 then the restraints of comity are
weaker when the same issue is placed before a subsequent court.246

243 Id. at 2376 n.7, 2382 n.12. In previous work, I have argued that due process imposes no
categorical barrier to the enforcement of a federal court’s denial of class certification in subsequent
cases, and that a prohibitory injunction against serial attempts to secure certification of the same
class in a new court are constitutionally possible and sometimes warranted. See Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 2035, 2109-17 (2008). I gave little attention in that treatment to the antecedent preclusion
questions that the Court addressed in Bayer. The significance of that component of the analysis
was made apparent when the Court provided a comprehensive restatement of the categories and
limitations on nonparty preclusion under federal common law in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880
(2008). See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.11 cmt. b (2010)
(citing Wolff, supra, at 2109-17) (discussing the state of the law after the Court’s decision in Taylor).
The Court’s holding in Bayer and its conservative treatment of the federal common law implications of the Class Action Fairness Act are both defensible. If Congress were to adopt a comprehensive approach to preclusion in federal class action litigation that included the possibility of
preemptive force for denials of class certification, my earlier analysis would still lead me to
conclude that due process would impose no categorical barrier.
Given the decision of the Court in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
497, 503-04 (2001), which adopted a strained interpretation of Rule 41(b) in order to avoid the
serious problems that would arise under the Rules Enabling Act if a Federal Rule purported to
mandate a rule of preclusion, it is surprising that the Bayer Court flags “a change in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure” as one possible response to its holding. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. at 2382 n.12.
244 See 131 S. Ct. at 2382 (“[W]e would expect federal courts to apply principles of comity to
each other’s class certification decisions when addressing a common dispute.”).
245 543 F.3d 597, 603-04 (10th Cir. 2008).
246 The Third Circuit recognized a similar distinction in an early TILA case, entertaining an
argument that decisions involving “nondiscretionary reasons for rejecting class action treatment”
might be proper subjects for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) whereas denials of
certification that “involve[] the exercise of discretion” would not. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496
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Another systemic counterweight is the ability of a district court to control the future preclusive effect of a class action judgment upon the ability
of absentees to pursue related individual claims. District courts have the
power to impose prospective constraints on the impact of their judgments in
order to avoid debilitating conflicts of interest among class members arising
from the risk of adverse preclusion consequences.247 A court presented with
a class action that otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 can
employ that power to facilitate certification where doing so is appropriate
under the preclusion policies governing the dispute.248 The decision not to
employ that power is, in effect, a discretionary judgment not to certify,
whereas the decision to impose preclusion constraints to overcome any
conflicts of interest is the affirmative use of discretion to certify a class.
Similarly, a court’s discretion to redefine a class may preserve the opportunity for class members to obtain the benefits of a representative proceeding
despite the bad choices or skewed incentives of their representatives, as in
Maneely v. City of Newburgh.249 The power of the court to protect class
members from adverse preclusion effects helps to preserve the viability of
that option.
B. Discretion in Class Certification After Shady Grove
It remains to ask whether this system of interlocking discretion in class
certification, developed over half a century and affirmed or acknowledged by
the Supreme Court on several occasions, was abruptly eliminated by the
Court’s opinion on the Rules Enabling Act in Shady Grove.250 In rejecting
the argument that New York CPLR § 901(b) should operate in place of
Federal Rule 23 when determining the availability of class relief on a
statutory damages claim, the Court described Rule 23 in terms that appear
disjunctive with the decades of practice described in the sections above.
Rule 23 “creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the
F.2d 747, 752-53 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). The court ultimately found that the distinction was not
controlling in a 1292(b) analysis. Id. at 756.
247 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(b) (1982) (recognizing an exception to the general prohibition against claim splitting when “[t]he court in the first action has
expressly reserved the plaintiff ’s right to maintain the second action”); see also In re Vitamin C
Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D. 90, 115-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (expressly reserving the right of class
members to pursue individual damages claims notwithstanding their membership in a class
seeking injunctive relief ) .
248 I have explored these issues at some length in earlier work. See generally Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005).
249 See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
250 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
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specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action,” the Court asserted—
it “provides a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding the class-action question.”251 Responding to Allstate’s argument that Rule 23 does not govern the
certification question in every case, the majority opined:
[T]hat is exactly what Rule 23 does: It says that if the prescribed preconditions are satisfied “[a] class action may be maintained” (emphasis added)—
not “a class action may be permitted.” Courts do not maintain actions; litigants
do. The discretion suggested by Rule 23’s “may” is discretion residing in the
plaintiff: He may bring his claim in a class action if he wishes. And like the
rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 automatically applies
“in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts,”
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699-700
(1979).252

Although the Court’s language here is broad and its emphatic tone typographically unmistakable, its holding addresses a limited question. The
Court’s citation to Yamasaki in this passage highlights the narrow compass
of its interpretation of Rule 23.
The argument that Allstate pursued before the Court, and to which this
passage responds, asserted that Rule 23 was inapplicable to the certification
question presented in that case—that class actions were wholly unavailable
in a suit asserting statutory damages under New York law because Rule 23
did not govern the question, leaving CPLR § 901(b) to control.253 Reflecting
the categorical nature of its position, Allstate attempted to rely upon a
distinction between the criteria for certification and the “antecedent question . . . whether the particular type of claim is eligible for class treatment
in the first place.”254 In this respect, Allstate was advancing an argument
similar to the primary contention urged by the Social Security Administration in Yamasaki: that class certification in general, and a nationwide class in
particular, was categorically unavailable in actions brought to enforce
certain requirements under the Social Security Act.255 The Yamasaki Court
rejected those categorical arguments in the portions of its opinion referenced

251
252
253

Id. at 1437.
Id. at 1438 (parallel citation omitted).
See Brief for Respondent at 10-12, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008) (arguing that CPLR § 901(b) “categorically precludes class
actions” and should apply in a federal diversity case).
254 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.
255 See 442 U.S. at 698 (noting the Social Security Administration’s argument that class
actions should be completely precluded under the relevant statute).
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in the passage from Shady Grove quoted above.256 However, as discussed in
Section II.C, the Yamasaki Court then proceeded to reaffirm the discretion
of federal courts to determine whether a nationwide class is appropriate in a
given case, taking into account the remedial needs of the plaintiffs, the
burdens that a nationwide class might impose upon the defendant, and the
broader systemic impact of a class action in light of other remedial proceedings already underway.257
The Court’s assertion in Shady Grove that “[t]he discretion suggested by
Rule 23’s ‘may’ is discretion residing in the plaintiff ” coupled with its
references to the “automatic” and “one-size-fits-all” character of the rule are
undeniably jarring.258 But those assertions respond to an argument about
the categorical inapplicability of Rule 23. They do not address the proper
application of the Rule in a given case. The Court’s rejection of the categorical argument in Yamasaki did not render a nationwide class automatically
available to any plaintiff who could show that the express requirements of
the Rule were satisfied. And the Reiter Court’s rejection of any categorical
prohibition on consumer antitrust class actions was accompanied by a strong
affirmation of the “broad power and discretion” vested in district courts
“with respect to matters involving the certification and management of
potentially cumbersome or frivolous class actions.”259 Shady Grove’s holding,
too, addresses only a narrow categorical question.
This more limited reading of Shady Grove’s treatment of Rule 23(b)
seems compelled by the position adopted in dissent by then-Judge Scalia in
Fink v. National Savings & Trust Co. As discussed above, Judge Scalia
insisted “that the District Court has broad discretion in determining
whether a suit should proceed as a class action,” going so far as to adopt a
rational-basis mode of analysis that would uphold a district court’s discretionary denial of certification even in the absence of specified reasons so
long as some proper basis for doing so could be discerned from the record.260 To read Shady Grove as foreclosing all discretion in the decision to

256 See id. at 700 (refusing to recognize that class relief under Rule 23 is unavailable without
“clear expression of congressional intent to exempt [the] actions”).
257 See id. at 702 (“[A] federal court when asked to certify a nationwide class should take care
to ensure that the nationwide relief is indeed appropriate in the case before it, and that certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the litigation of similar issues in other
judicial districts.”).
258 130 S. Ct. at 1437-38.
259 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979).
260 Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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certify would ascribe a fatal inconsistency to Justice Scalia’s treatment of the
issue.
The limited scope of the Court’s holding in Shady Grove is further illustrated by the position adopted by Justice Stevens in concurrence and the
four dissenters led by Justice Ginsburg, who together formed a majority. All
five embrace the proposition that Rule 23 (and any Federal Rule) must be
applied with sensitivity to the impact the Rule might have upon the substantive policies of the applicable state law in a given case.261 Their disagreement, and hence the result in the case, centered on the proper
interpretation of CPLR § 901(b), which Justice Stevens did not believe to
be a part of the liability policy of New York.262
As Professor Burbank and I have argued, there is much to criticize about
this style of analysis, which invites non-uniform interpretations of the
Federal Rules and threatens to elevate state substantive law over federal
substantive law in the Rules Enabling Act hierarchy. The better interpretation would recognize the limited ability of Rule 23 to set substantive
aggregate-liability policy in any case, requiring that courts applying the Rule
always “look to the substantive liability and regulatory regimes of state and
federal law in determining whether aggregate relief is appropriate and
consistent with the goals of that underlying law.”263 Many lower federal
courts have done exactly that.
That difference aside, however, a clear majority of the Justices in Shady
Grove did conclude that federal courts must make judgments about the
propriety of class certification in light of the impact that certification would
have upon the underlying substantive law. Thus, despite its broad language,
the majority portion of Shady Grove’s lead opinion must be understood as
addressing only a Rules Enabling Act question: Rule 23’s applicability in the
face of contrary state procedural authority, which is what Justice Stevens
understood CPLR § 901(b) to constitute.264
261 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“I thus agree with Justice Ginsburg that a federal rule, like any federal law, must be
interpreted in light of many different considerations, including ‘sensitivity to important state
interests’ and ‘regulatory policies.’” (citations omitted)).
262 See id. (“I disagree with Justice Ginsburg, however, about the degree to which the meaning of federal rules may be contorted, absent congressional authority to do so, to accommodate
state policy goals.”); id. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding no need to apply Rule 23
because the New York state statute was directed to achieving a substantive result with regard to
liability).
263 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 198, at 21.
264 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that CPLR § 901(b) is procedural and not “sufficiently interwoven with the
scope of a substantive right or remedy” to present a Rules Enabling Act problem).
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Many lower federal courts discussing the propriety and bounds of class
certification in light of discretionary factors, particularly those touching on
matters of liability or regulatory policy, have located their analysis in the
superiority requirement when an action for damages is proposed under
subsection (b)(3), or in the general standards of equitable relief and the
proposition that injunctive relief should be “appropriate” when a plaintiff
files under subsection (b)(2). No part of the Court’s opinion in Shady Grove
addresses those features of Rule 23. Although it is true that the Court built
up a head of rhetorical steam in rejecting Allstate’s categorical argument
under the Rules Enabling Act, it would be a mistake to read the opinion as
speaking in any way to the administration of these provisions of the Rule.
Other courts exercising discretion in class certification, in contrast, have
treated this power as inherent in the Rule 23 inquiry—as indeed the Court
itself did in Yamasaki and Reiter—rather than tying discretion to particular
provisions of the Rule. In some instances, courts have pointed to the “may
be maintained” language of Rule 23(b) as evidence of that inherent
discretion.265 This was an unremarkable proposition before Shady Grove
introduced confusion about the significance of that language. For the time
being, at least, there is room for debate about the status of extra-textual
discretion under Rule 23, and federal courts would be well-advised to
provide specific textual grounding when a proposed class action requires the
exercise of judgment.266 For example, a ruling on the scope of class certification in an immature tort case, as in Rhone-Poulenc, might require a court to
provide more specific justification under the superiority requirement of
section (b)(3), as the Fifth Circuit did in Castano.267
In the years since the Court decided Shady Grove, the lower federal
courts have treated the case almost exclusively as a Rules Enabling Act
decision and have given it little attention in the class certification analysis.
That response is appropriate. It would be preferable for the Court to clarify
the limited scope of its ruling, and better still for it to issue a mea culpa for
265 See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 47 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(“[T]he Court regards any order at this stage as nothing more than a tentative determination for
procedural purposes that the action may be maintained as a class action on behalf of a defined
class.”).
266 See, e.g., In re TWL Corp., 712 F.3d 886, 894-95 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting language from
Shady Grove describing Rule 23 as creating “a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff . . . to pursue
his claim as a class action” but also reaffirming that a district court has discretion in determining
whether the superiority requirement is satisfied).
267 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A]t this time,
while the tort [of inducing nicotine-dependence] is immature, the class complaint must be
dismissed, as class certification cannot be found to be a superior method of adjudication.”); id. at
746-51 (undertaking an extended superiority analysis).
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its loose treatment of the language of Rule 23(b). In the interim, however,
there is no cause for lower federal courts to make significant changes to
their certification practice under Rule 23 outside of the specific Rules
Enabling Act issue that Shady Grove addressed.
CONCLUSION
In his book How Judges Think, Judge Posner makes a trenchant case for
pragmatism in the administration of complex legal questions. “The core of
legal pragmatism,” he writes, “is pragmatic adjudication, and its core is
heightened judicial concern for consequences and thus a disposition to base
policy judgments on them rather than on conceptualisms and generalities.”268 In response to the objection that pragmatic analysis leads to “ad hoc
adjudication, in the sense of having regard only for the consequences to the
parties to the immediate case,” Judge Posner insists that “sensible legal
pragmatism tells the judge to consider systemic, including institutional,
consequences as well as consequences of the decision in the case at hand.”269
The drafters of modern Rule 23 understood that they were placing a tool
in the hands of the judiciary that would give rise to significant changes in
civil litigation, the legal profession, and the content of the underlying law
itself. As Professor Kaplan wrote, “[n]ew [R]ule 23 alters the pattern of class
actions; subdivision (b)(3), in particular, is a new category deliberately
created.”270 The effects of such a paradigm shift were unpredictable at the
inception, and the ongoing adjustments necessary to maintain a workable
system of class adjudication have never lent themselves easily to specification within the text of the Rule. Rather, lower federal courts have pursued a
course of sensible legal pragmatism of the type that Judge Posner
endorsed—including, in appropriate cases, “sustaining the authority of the
trial court to employ realism and good sense in denying class action status”271 where doing so is most faithful to the underlying substantive law.
The point of recognizing discretion in class certification is not to restrict
the class action as a tool for the private enforcement of public norms. To the
contrary, the point is to preserve it. If the class action is to retain its vitality,
then the federal judiciary must remember its own history. Lower federal
courts have employed a range of tools to authorize class treatment as a
means of carrying into effect important statutory and constitutional policies
268
269
270

RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 238 (2008).
Id.
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 399 (1967).
271 Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, 474 F.2d 336, 347 (10th Cir. 1973).

1952

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1897

while employing their discretion to prevent class certification from producing
counterproductive and unsustainable results. The Supreme Court exhibited
an unfortunate tone deafness to that doctrinal symphony when choosing
some of the language with which it responded to the Rules Enabling Act
question placed before it in Shady Grove. There is reason to believe, however,
that any appearance of an anomaly will be short-lived.

